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I. INTRODUCTION

While arbitration has existed in one form or another for
centuries, and has at times even had a central role in both domestic
and international dispute resolution,' its recent rise to prominence
and acceptability on the contemporary international scene has been
both abrupt and overwhelming. 2 From a situation less than a
century ago in which arbitration was rare and pre-dispute
arbitration agreements were often legally invalid,3 one of the most
oft-repeated statements in contemporary arbitral scholarship is the
observation that arbitration has now become the "dispute
resolution mechanism of choice" for the resolution of cross-border
disputes. 4 Indeed, empirical studies indicate a strong preference for
1. See generally the remarkable survey and bibliography in Derek
Roebuck, Sources for the History ofArbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L 237 (1998).
2. For example, the number of requests for arbitrations filed with the four
most prestigious international commercial arbitration institutions more than
doubled in the decade from 1993 to 2003. TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 341 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W.
Naimark eds., 2005) [hereinafter SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION]

(extracting from a table the data on the American Arbitration Association, the
International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International
Arbitration, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce). Similarly, although the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was founded
in 1966, the first ICSID arbitration did not occur until 1972. From that point one
to two cases were usually filed per year, until the mid- 1990s, when there was a
"dramatic increase in activity." There are now, on average, two new cases per
month, with over 100 cases pending in early 2007. RUDOLF DOLZER &
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 224
(2008).
3.

YVES DERAINS & ERIC A. SCWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF

ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the "jurisdictions, of which there were
still many [in 1922] that did not recognize the validity of an agreement to
arbitrate future disputes").
4. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Empirical Perspectives on
International Commercial Arbitration, in SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 2, at 3 ("Arbitration is the dispute resolution
mechanism of choice for parties to international contracts."); Richard H.
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international arbitration over domestic litigation, 5 and States of all
levels of wealth and power have felt the need to rewrite their laws
to make them more "arbitration friendly." 6 Similarly, courses in
international arbitration are now routinely offered in law schools
worldwide, academic scholarship on arbitration appears in even the
most prestigious journals, and law firms of all sizes attempt to
claim specialized expertise at representing clients in international
arbitration.
Yet, this growth has not come without controversy. Procedures
that were developed to resolve disputes between private
commercial actors have been a source of concern when applied in
disputes in which one party is a State, 7 or when significant
consequences will result for an individual or group not represented
in the arbitration. 8 In addition, the view is increasingly expressed
that the apparent suitability of arbitration for the resolution of
international disputes can at times be misleading, as difficulties can
easily arise when norms developed for the resolution of Western
disputes are applied in a different cultural context. 9 Perhaps most

Kreindler, Aspects of Illegality in the Formationand Performance of Contracts,
6 INT'L ARB. L. REv. 1 (2003).
5. SCH. OF INT'L ARBITRATION, QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006,

at 5 (2006) ("When the same respondents were asked which mechanism they
preferred to use, 73% stated international arbitration; either alone (29%) or in
combination with ADR mechanisms in a multi-tiered, or escalating, dispute
resolution process (44%). ADR mechanisms as a standalone approach were
favoured by 16% of the corporations; transnational litigation was preferred by
only 11%.").
6. For example, since the adoption of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration ("Model Law") in 1985, legislation based on the Model Law has
been adopted in sixty-two countries. Status: 1985-UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitraltexts/arbitration/i 985Modelarbitrationstatus.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2009).
7. See, e.g., Damon Vis-Dunbar, Meg Kinnear Elected as Secretary-

General of ICSID, INvESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.
investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/03/03/meg-kinnear-electedas-secretary-general-of-icsid.aspx ("[T]he Centre has come under criticism on a
number of fronts from civil society groups.").
8. See generally James Harrison, Human Rights Arguments in Amicus

Curiae Submissions: Promoting Social Justice?, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION

HUMAN

RIGHTS

IN

396 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy

et al. eds., 2009).
9. See generally Tony Cole, Commercial Arbitration in Japan:
Contributions to the Debate on "JapaneseNon-Litigiousness," 40 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 29 (2007); See also Karen Mills, Cultural Differences and
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notably, however, given the traditional consensual basis of
arbitration, arbitral awards are increasingly being challenged in
court by the losing party,' 0 even in the face of consistent efforts on
the part of States to make them almost unchallengeable. 11
In short, while arbitration has unquestionably been a success in
the international dispute resolution "marketplace," effectively
resolving problems still faced by international litigation,' 2 it is
becoming increasingly doubtful that it still functions well as a
means of genuine dispute resolution, rather than merely being
desired as a means of avoiding the constraints of domestic
litigation. As a result, the enormous potential of arbitration as a
dispute resolution mechanism is being increasingly wasted.
This Article will attempt to demonstrate that this situation has
arisen because a dispute resolution mechanism initially designed to
be invoked post-dispute, between parties who both wished to
arbitrate, is now being applied in a far broader range of situations,
Ethnic Bias in International Dispute Resolution: An Arbitrator/Mediator's
Perspective, TRANSNAT'L DIsp. MGMT. (2008).
10. See, e.g., HAMiD G. GHARAVI, THE INTERNATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE ANNULMENT OF AN ARBITRAL AWARD 2 (2002) ("The 'gentleman era' has
come to an end. It has been dethroned by interminable pleadings and lengthy
hearings during which attorneys multiply diverse objections with a view to
challenging the resulting award. . . . Though the vast majority of awards
continue to be enforced voluntarily by parties, the tendency is progressively
leaning towards challenging arbitral awards . . . ." (citations omitted)); Alan
Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 449, 527 (2005) (noting the "sudden torrent" of litigation by
"disappointed arbitrants" attempting to have an arbitration award overturned for
"manifest disregard of the law"). Similarly, an analysis of investment arbitration
awards reported on the website of the ICSID shows that in cases in which a final
award was delivered prior to 2000, a request for annulment of the award was
made twenty-five percent of the time. By contrast, of final awards delivered in
the period 2004-2008, a request for annulment was made forty-one percent of
the time. See unpublished analytical data (on file with author).
11. See, e.g., Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention: Summary
of Court Decisions, in THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958, at 46, 89 (Marc
Blessing ed., 1996) (reporting that awards were successfully vacated under the
New York Convention in only 2 of 556 reported cases); see also Prostyakov v.
Masco Corp., 513 F.3d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 2008) ("But in short, we will uphold
an arbitral award unless there is no possible interpretive route to [it] ....
(alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)).
12. See, e.g., NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD
229 (1997) ("[S]ince the courts generally insist that documents relevant to a
dispute be submitted in Arabic, this can impose substantial translation costs in a
complex dispute.... In Egypt and the Gulf, it is not unusual for a court to take
several years before issuing a final decision-and the decision itself can
generally be appealed. . . . International arbitration is often deemed to be more
predictable than local litigation.").
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usually involving a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, and often
involving one party that does not wish to arbitrate at all. This
change means that the characteristics that previously resulted in
parties to an arbitration accepting and voluntarily abiding by the
award delivered by the arbitrator rarely exist now. Moreover, the
procedural innovations that have been adopted to adapt arbitration
to the new contexts in which it now occurs have not been
effectively designed to provide parties with any reason to accept
the award delivered. Consequently, contemporary international
arbitration simply no longer functions properly as a means of
genuinely resolving disputes and is instead increasingly coming to
represent merely a legal game, invoked by parties due to the
enforceability of its awards rather than because the system
produces desirable results.
Part II of the Article will discuss the nature of judicial authority
as a means of examining what characteristics of a judicial decision
will lead to it being accepted by the parties as inherently binding,
rather than merely obeyed by them because effective review is
unavailable. It will identify four different types of authority that a
judicial decision can possess. It will then defend this analysis
against the argument that only legally unsophisticated parties truly
view legal decisions as authoritative and that therefore such an
analysis is irrelevant to international arbitration, which is unlikely
to involve legally unsophisticated parties.
Part III of the Article will then apply this analysis to traditional
arbitration,1 3 establishing the particular types of authority that
historically led parties to accept arbitral awards as binding. It will
argue that the authority of a traditional arbitral award was
inherently personal, relying upon the possession by the arbitrators
of certain personal characteristics.
Part IV will then address the differences that exist between
contemporary international arbitration and traditional arbitration,
focusing specifically upon the means by which, and context in
which, arbitrators are selected by the parties and the role arbitrators
are expected to perform once they are appointed. It will illustrate
that these differences mean that the forms of authority that were
13. The term "traditional arbitration" is used in this Article to refer
generally to any form of arbitration prior to the recent rise of contemporary
international commercial arbitration. In this sense it will generally refer to
arbitrations taking place prior to the twentieth century. However, it ultimately
refers to a style of arbitration rather than an arbitration occurring at a particular
time. As a result, the term can also be applied to arbitrations occurring today,
where they are conducted in a manner more consistent with that of pre-twentieth
century arbitrations than of arbitration as it is currently practiced in international
commercial arbitration.

806

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70

possessed by awards delivered in traditional arbitration are rarely
possessed by awards delivered in contemporary international
arbitration. Moreover, nothing in contemporary international
arbitration delivers additional authority to arbitral awards. As a
result, while an arbitral award may indeed be authoritative for the
parties to the arbitration in certain specific instances, this authority
derives solely from facts unique to that arbitration. As a form of
dispute resolution, on the other hand, contemporary international
arbitration is simply structurally incapable of delivering
authoritative awards.
Part V will then examine the possibility that the increasing
procedural uniformity of contemporary international arbitration
can provide a means of delivering authority to arbitral awards. Just
as the formal court structure underlying a court judgment delivers
authority to that judgment, it might be argued that as international
'14
arbitration formalizes procedurally an authoritative "institution ,
will develop capable of delivering authority to arbitral awards. It
will, however, be argued that to the extent arbitration is indeed
becoming procedurally formalized, the rationale underlying the
selection of rules to be standardized precludes the formation of any
authoritative institution.
Part VI will then examine the one remaining means by which
authority can be conveyed to arbitral awards, namely through the
procedures used in the arbitral proceedings. While the
standardization of procedures throughout international arbitration
will not result in the delivery of authoritative awards, it will be
argued that parties will view awards as authoritative when the
awards are delivered through procedures specifically designed for
the identity of the parties and the nature of the dispute.
Part VII will then conclude by proposing specific means by
which the problem of the loss of authority in contemporary
international arbitration can be addressed. It will argue that rather
than merely encouraging arbitrators to use the power they already
possess to design procedures to match the specific dispute at hand,
14. The term "institution" is here presented in "scare quotes" to emphasize
that the institution in question would be a "social institution," existing solely
through the conformity of diverse actors to certain social norms. It would not,
that is, be an institution in the sense of the International Chamber of Commerce
or the United Nations. In the (somewhat convoluted) words of sociologist
Jonathan Turner, a "social institution" is "acomplex of positions, roles, norms
and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organizing
relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental
problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and
in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment." JONATHAN
H. TURNER, THE INSTITUTIONAL ORDER 6 (1997) (italics omitted).
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an additional role should be added to contemporary international
arbitration in the form of a "procedural special master." While
such an individual should only be appointed with the consent of
the parties, and would perform his role in consultation with the
parties, his decisions would be binding unless opposed by both
parties and would not be mere recommendations for the parties to
accept or reject. In addition, it will be argued that the role of
arbitrators in international arbitration must be reconceptualized,
with party-appointed arbitrators required to abandon their
traditional detachment from their nominating party, and instead,
while remaining independent and objective decision-makers, serve
as the explicators of their nominating party's positions to the
remainder of the tribunal.
II. THE AUTHORITY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

A. Types ofAuthority that Can Be Deliveredto JudicialDecisions
Before arguing that arbitrator authority is central to
contemporary international arbitration, it is necessary to have at
least a general idea of what is meant by the term "authority" in this
context and what roles it can have in the response of disputing
parties to a legal decision. As the paradigm case of the authority of
a legal judgment concerns judicial decisions rather than arbitral
awards, this part of the Article will focus upon judicial, rather than
arbitral, decisions. This analysis will then be built upon in
subsequent parts of the Article, with full recognition of the
differences between judges and contemporary international
arbitrators, as a means of addressing the roles of arbitral authority
in contemporary international arbitration.
It is first necessary to be clear on the kind of authority that this
Article addresses. The "authority of law" is an oft-addressed
question within contemporary jurisprudence, and it has been the
subject of work by some of the most important contemporary legal
theorists. 15 Yet the overwhelming focus of this work has been the
normative question of when individuals subject to the
pronouncements of specific legal figures should see themselves as
obligated to act in accordance with the pronouncements of those

15. See, e.g., LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE (1988); JOSEPH
RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1970); Kenneth Einar Himma, Law's Claim of
Legitimate Authority, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 271 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 2001); Stephen Perry, Second
OrderReasons, Uncertainty,and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 913 (1989).
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figures, whether they agree with them or not. 16 This is, however, a
fundamentally different analysis of authority than the kind being
undertaken here.
As this Article is concerned with the practical question of the
degree to which parties freely adhere to the arbitral awards that
they receive, the type of authority relevant to this discussion is
what can be called the "social" analysis of authority. 17 This type of
analysis of authority focuses on the question of when parties do, as
a matter of fact, view legal decisions as binding upon themwhether or not they are right to do so from a theoretical
perspective.
To clarify, a normative account of authority attempts to
describe the conditions under which a given individual does indeed
legitimately have authority over certain other individuals, such that
the latter should obey his directives simply because he has
delivered them. A social account of authority, on the other hand,
makes no claims whatsoever about whether the directives of the
alleged authority should or should not be obeyed by any particular
group of subjects. Rather, it focuses on the social reality that
individuals do consistently acknowledge other individuals as
having authority over them in certain situations and attempts to
explain what specifies those situations. Whether the alleged
authorities indeed have genuine authority or not is simply
irrelevant to this latter investigation.
Of course, emphasizing the subjective reasons that individuals
have for obeying the decisions of legal decision-makers
unavoidably raises the risk of an excessively fragmented analysis.
After all, even if individuals from a particular social group all
share a specific reason for accepting the authority of the decisions
of a given legal actor, this in no way indicates that individuals
from other social groups will also accept that reason as motivating
obedience. It needs to be emphasized, then, that while the results of
the following analysis are indeed intended to be broadly
applicable, it is not claimed that a series of more fine-grained
analyses could not be performed for individual social groups. That
is, this analysis is intended to provide a foundation for a
generalized discussion of authority. It would, however, need to be

16. RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 14
(1980) ("Authority yields (authorities issue) commands to be obeyed or rules to
be subscribed to, not statements to be believed.").
17. See generally Eduardo Zambrano, Authority, Social Theories of in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

(N.J. Smelser & P.B. Baltes eds., 2001).
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supplemented with additional factual details whenever a particular
social group, or even an individual, is being discussed.18
Two additional points need to be made before entering into the
substantive discussion to ensure that what this discussion attempts
to address is clear. First, it must be emphasized that the present
discussion does not concern the authority of "law" but rather the
authority of individual decisions handed down at specific times by
specific individuals. After all, individuals who appeal legal
decisions, or take advantage of any other means provided by a
legal system to resist a decision's enforcement, are in no way
challenging the binding nature of law. Indeed, they are acting in
complete conformity with the law, as it is the law that provides the
opportunities for appeal that are being used. Consequently, it is
quite possible for the losing party in a dispute to view the law as
binding but nonetheless seek to overturn the specific legal decision
applicable to him.
Second, it is also essential to note the distinction between
acceptance of a decision and mere acquiescence to it. In both cases
the decision will remain unchallenged. However, acquiescence
does not occur because of any authority attached to the award but
because of some element external to the judgment. To give an
example, a losing party may fiercely dispute the correctness of a
judge's decision but nonetheless not seek to have it overturned on
the ground that, even though it is wrong, the proceeding was fair,
and the judge's decision was not irrational or prejudiced. In such a
case the decision is not accepted as binding by the losing party but
is merely allowed to stay in force. What is sought in the following
analysis, then, is not those characteristics of a legal decision that
will lead a losing party to simply abandon any attempt to resist that
decision but those characteristics that will lead to the decision
actually being endorsed by the losing party as an appropriate
resolution of the dispute, even though they do not see the
correctness of the conclusion.
These clarifications being made, it is necessary to dispense
with one fairly basic justification for obeying a legal decision,
namely its demonstrable correctness. While it is certainly true that
most parties to a court case will see the demonstrable correctness
of a judge's decision as in itself providing a decisive reason for
adhering to it, it is nonetheless clear that only a minority of legal
18. It is worth emphasizing here the difference between "social group" and
"culture." Use of the term "social group" reflects the likelihood that even an
apparently culturally homogeneous jurisdiction will in reality be divisible into
many different "social groups." Tony Cole, Book Review, 27 PHIL. iN REv. 286
(2006).
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decisions will ever be recognized by the losing party as
demonstrably correct. After all, even the most correctly reasoned
and thoroughly explained legal decision will unavoidably involve
factual or legal points on which a view rejected by the judge was
also defensible. Legal decisions are not deductively solid
arguments based on indisputable facts but merely defensible
interpretations of conflicting factual and legal claims.'
Indeed, it is precisely because of the underdetermined nature of
legal decisions that there is any need for parties to a dispute to see
a judicial decision as authoritative since a demonstrably correct
decision can be obeyed simply because of its correctness,
without
' 20
invocation of any form of background "authority."
For an account of the authority of a legal decision, then, it is
necessary to concentrate on the context of the legal decision, not
on its substantive correctness. Thus, the question is how a legal
decision, independent of its content, can provide a losing party
with a reason to accept it as binding. Only through such a contentindependent analysis will it be possible to isolate the source of the
authority of the decision, as opposed to the authority of reason or
of truth.
This notion of the authority of a legal decision as necessarily
independent of its content is a familiar one from academic
discussions of the authority of law, as it plays a central role in the
theory of authority advanced by Joseph Raz. 2 1 Raz's theory is
19. There are, of course, many writings on the nature of legal reasoning.
Excellent general treatments of the topic can be found inMARTIN GOLDING,
LEGAL REASONING (1984); EDWARD LEVY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING (1948); NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL
THEORY (1978).
20. "Underdetermination" is a term commonly used in philosophy of
science to refer to situations in which two or more mutually inconsistent theories
are equally justifiable under the available evidence. See generally THOMAS
BONK, UNDERDETERMINATION: AN ESSAY ON EvIDENCE AND THE LIMITS OF

(2008); Alexander Bird, Underdetermination and
Evidence, in IMAGES OF EMPIRICISM 62 (Bradley Monton ed., 2007).
21. Raz's account is well captured in this following example:
Consider the case of two people who refer a dispute to an arbitrator. He
has authority to settle the dispute for they agreed to abide by his
decision. Two features stand out. First, the arbitrator's decision is for
the disputants a reason for action. They ought to do as he says because
he says so. But this reason is related to the other reasons which apply to
the case. It is not just another reason to be added to the others, a reason
to stand alongside the others when one reckons which way is better
supported by reason. The arbitrator's decision is meant to be based on
the other reasons, to sum them up and to reflect their outcome.
NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 212 (1995)
ETHIcs].

[hereinafter RAZ,
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normative rather than social, so it may initially appear irrelevant
here. However, while Raz's conclusions are normative, his
analysis draws directly from a common understanding of the
nature of authority and hence serves as an insightful guide to what
motivates obedience to a legal decision. Consequently, while Raz's
analysis will not be adopted here as providing the structure through
which authority is to be analyzed, its insight and subtlety mean that
it provides an excellent initial analytical step.
Raz breaks his theory of authority down into three theses: (1)
the dependence thesis, (2) the normal justification thesis, and (3)
the preemption thesis. In general terms, Raz's argument is that an
authority's decision does not merely give those subject to it2 2 an
extra reason to consider when deciding for themselves how to act
but rather replaces any other reasons they may have for action (this
is the preemption thesis). 23 In addition, for the decision to be
authoritative, the decision-maker must base her decision upon the
same reasons to which those subject to the decision should
themselves appeal in making their own decision-after all, the
authority's decision is intended to replace their decision, not to
merely be an alternative (this is the dependence thesis).2 4 Finally,
what normally justifies a conclusion that a given individual has
authority over particular other individuals is that the individual
subject to the decision is more likely to comply with those reasons
to which he should appeal in making his decision by adhering to
the authority's decision than if25he made a decision himself (this is
the normal justification thesis).
22. That is, in the present discussion, the disputing parties in the arbitration.
23. JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 46 (1988) [hereinafter RAZ,
MORALITY OF FREEDOM] ("[T]the fact that an authority requires performance of
an action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other
relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the
place of some of them."); JOSEPH RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMs 193

(Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1975) ("The authority's directives become our
reasons. While the acceptance of the authority is based on belief that its
directives are well-founded in reason, they are understood to yield the benefits
they are meant to bring only if we do rely on them rather than on our own
independent judgment of the merits of each case to which they apply.").
24. RAz, MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 23, at 47 ("[A]II authoritative
directives should be based on reasons which already independently apply to the
subjects of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances
covered by the directive.").
25. Id. at 53 ("[T]he normal way to establish that a person has authority
over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to
comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative
directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively
binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons
which apply to him directly.").
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Raz's vision of the authority of a legal decision, then, is one
ultimately based on expertise: the authority's decision should be
obeyed because it is more likely to be correct than a decision
reached by the individual to whom the decision is delivered. More
than this, though, the authority's decision is one that the recipients
of the decision would ultimately reach were they able to abstract
themselves from their personal involvement in the dispute and
effectively reason their way through the facts and arguments. Raz,
that is, is relying upon what he terms a "service conception of
authority": authority serves the parties as a means of delivering to
them a more correct decision than they would have reached,
26
thereby eliminating the need for them to derive the conclusion.
This notion of an authoritative decision as providing a
"service" to the recipients of the decision underlines one central
element of any social analysis of authority, namely that treating the
decisions of another as authoritative constitutes a means of moving
beyond one's immediate analytic abilities. Whether the rationale is
that one does not have the time to perform the analysis
satisfactorily oneself, or that one lacks the ability to perform the
analysis at the required level, there would simply be no point in
subjecting oneself to the decisions of another if those decisions
were not viewed as giving one information that one could not
currently get alone. While Raz adopts the service conception of
authority as part of a normative analysis of authority, then, it
nonetheless is also clearly applicable in the context of the social
analysis being performed here.
1. The "Efficiency" Rationalefor Authority
As just stated, however, there are two ways in which the
service provided by an authoritative decision might be useful to
parties to a dispute. First, in some cases authority will serve merely
as a "time saver." In such a case, given adequate time and
resources, the disputants could indeed have reasoned their own
way to the judge's conclusion. By appealing to the superior
abilities of a third party, they benefit from that third party's
expertise, through which she is able to reach the conclusion in
question more quickly than the disputants could reach it
themselves.
This constitutes what will here be referred to as the
"efficiency" rationale for authority. It cannot, however, by itself
suffice as an analysis of authority, as it is clear that there will be a
significant number of cases, if not an overwhelming majority of
26. RAZ, ETHICS, supra note 21, at 214.
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cases, in which the disputants simply could not have reached the
conclusion obtained by the judge. In such cases the disputants must
simply accept the decision of the judge, unable to evaluate its
substantive correctness, but relying upon indicators of
trustworthiness not derived from the decision, such as the judge's
professional standing or other personal characteristics.
2. The "Personal"Rationalefor Authority
This constitutes the second element of a broad analysis of
authority, whereby the service provided by the authority is not
merely to provide a more efficient means of reaching a conclusion
that the disputants could theoretically have reached themselves.
Instead, the authority delivers a decision that the disputants cannot
rationally explicate and defend but that they nonetheless endorse as
an appropriate settlement of their dispute due to certain personal
characteristics of the individual providing the decision. This will
be referred to as the "personal" rationale for authority.
a. The "Insight" Rationalefor Authority
An important point for the present discussion is that the
"personal" rationale can be broken down into three distinct aspects.
First, the judge may have made a rationally unjustified step in her
reasoning, relying upon a "hunch" regarding the correct way to
27
resolve the dispute rather than a solidly constructed argument.
Nonetheless, despite the judge's inability to provide a rationally
defensible basis for her conclusion, the parties accept the decision
as satisfactory and binding. Unlike with respect to the "efficiency"
rationale for authority, then, when the parties are at least
28
theoretically able to evaluate the validity of the judge's decision,
under this "insight" rationale for authority the disputants must
instead rely upon certain personal characteristics of the judge that
adequately convince them that any rationally indefensible steps she
27. The classic statement of the "hunch" view ofjudicial decision-making is
found in Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). Notably, Raz
himself acknowledges that reasons often underdetermine our choices, leaving
more than one conclusion available as rationally defensible: "[W]hen no option
is supported by conclusive reasons, when we face conflicting adequate reasons
for action, the explanation of why we followed the reasons we did will involve
more than the invocation of our rationality. It will allude to our tastes,

predilections, and much else besides." JOSEPH

RAZ, ENGAGING REASON

(1999).
28. This is true even if they did not actually perform the analysis.
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takes in her reasoning will ultimately be correct ones. The judge
may, for example, have a reputation for insight born of long
experience, or perhaps for fairness in deciding between disputing
parties, or even just a reputation for delivering judgments that
satisfy both parties. As a result, the disputants are willing to
endorse the judge's decision, as they accept that any leaps in
reasoning will be performed in an acceptable manner.
Notably, this form of authority is the one most closely tied to
the long tradition of informal dispute settlement, including nonbinding arbitration, as it requires the parties to be willing simply to
trust in the good judgment of the judge and, as a result, accept a
decision that is not clearly rationally defensible. Obviously this
form of authority requires either a strong familiarity of the parties
with the judge or at least a belief by the parties that the judge has
the personal
characteristics necessary to make intuitive leaps
29
correctly.
b. The "Expertise" Rationalefor Authority
A second variant of the "personal" rationale for authority arises
when the parties do not have a generalized faith in the judge's
decision-making abilities but rather acknowledge the judge's
superior ability to reason to the proper conclusion. In basic cases of
this "expertise" rationale for authority, such as in civil disputes
involving legally unsophisticated parties, this can be as simple a
matter as the higher level of training or even higher intelligence of
the judge, which the parties accept as allowing the judge to reason
to a conclusion
that the parties could not justifiably reach by
30
themselves.
29. For example, certain individuals may simply presume that an individual
holding high judicial office must have the characteristics justifying reliance on
her judgment or else she would not have made it to that level. Consequently, any
judgement delivered by that judge will be regarded by those individuals as
authoritative. As the discussion in this Article concerns a social analysis of
authority rather than a normative one, it is irrelevant whether the judge in
question does indeed have the characteristics necessary for her to be an
authority. All that matters is that the parties to the dispute believe that she does.
30. The term "justifiably" is important here, as the question is not whether
the parties would indeed reach that conclusion or whether they would reach it by
socially acceptable forms of argument. While "expertise" authority is an element
of the social analysis of authority, it is inherently tied to a notion that the
authority is reaching a correct answer rather than merely a socially acceptable
one. Consequently, the authority's conclusion must be justifiable, as in
accordance with norms of correct reasoning. There are many theoretical works
regarding what constitutes correct reasoning, as this is hardly a settled topic.
However, an excellent survey of the field can be found in JOHN L. POLLOCK &

2010] CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

815

The "expertise" rationale, however, does not merely appear in
cases involving legally unsophisticated parties but can also exist
when the disputants are sophisticated legal actors with highly paid
attorneys to consult and the judge is an individual with
acknowleded specialized insight into the legal subject matter of
the dispute. Thus, for example, an opinion in an antitrust case by
a judge recognized as possessing significant expertise in this area
may be authoritative for the disputants even though an opinion by
the same judge on a different issue might not.
Unlike the "insight" rationale for authority, where the parties
must trust in the judge to properly take a rationally indefensible
step to an appropriate decision, the "expertise" rationale will be
operative if the judge's decision is indeed rationally defensible but
relies upon reasoning that can only be followed by individuals with
a level of knowledge or ability not possessed by the parties to the
dispute.
c. The "Institutional"Rationalefor Authority
The final version of "personal" authority is distinguishable
from both the "insight" and "expertise" variants, as it emphasizes
not the judge's ability to reach a substantively appropriate
conclusion but rather the judge's ability to reach a socially
32
appropriate conclusion, whether substantively correct or not.

(2d ed. 1999).
Important individual accounts are in ALVIN GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE INASOCIAL
WORLD (1999); A MIND OF ONE'S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND
OBJECTIVITY (Louise M. Antony & Charlotte Witt eds., 1993); RICHARD
JOSEPH CRUZ, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE

SWINBURNE, EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS (2000).

(2001);

TIMOTHY

WILLIAMSON,

31. The question of when an individual is justified in relying upon the views
of an expert is a specialized topic within epistemology, but a good general
treatment

is provided in DOUGLAS N. WALTON, APPEAL TO EXPERT OPINION

(1997).
32. That is, what is sought by the parties to the dispute is not a judgment
regarding which individual acted correctly as judged by a specific legal rule but
rather which individual acted in accordance with broader social norms regarding
the conduct of the activities in question within the community to which both
parties belong. As a result, it matters less that the judge's application of the law
is correct, in the sense of matching the interpretations made by higher courts
within that legal system, than that the law is applied in a way consistent with the
views of a particular social group. The importance of this distinction between
the written law and the law as it actually exists in the community is best
expressed in the enormously insightful work of Eugen Ehrlich. EUGEN EHRLICH,
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 356 (1913) ("[I]f
English law should be introduced anywhere on the continent of Europe, the
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This "institutional" rationale for authority exists when although
the disputants may deny that the judge actually has any superior
abilities in reasoning or judgment, they nonetheless recognize the
judge's superior ability to reach a conclusion that properly reflects
the standards applied within a particular social group. The judge's
decision, then, is authoritative not because
of the judge's abilities
33
but because of his representativeness.
In its most basic variant, this form of authority will arise when
the parties to the dispute both belong to a single community and
both desire a validation of their actions as being in accordance with
the norms of the community. 34 If the judge also comes from that
community and properly applies that community's standards in
reaching a decision, both parties will have reason to accept her
decision as an appropriate settlement of their dispute.

family, the corporations, ownership, the real rights, and the contracts would
remain what they had been until then; and even though they should be adjudged
according to English law, they would not become English legal relations. Legal
relations are created by society, not by legal propositions."); Eugen Ehrlich, The
Sociology of Law, 36 HARv. L. REV. 130, 137-38 (1922) ("An oriental despot
can, if he pleases, level a city to the earth or condemn a few thousand human
beings, but he cannot introduce civil marriage into his kingdom .... It is not
enough that a statute is passed; it must be capable of being enforced.").
33. A parallel can be drawn here with ethical arguments relating to moral
relativism, which argue that the morally correct action in any given situation is
not dictated by any absolute moral norm but rather depends upon the personal
and social context in which the action takes place. See generally GILBERT
HARMAN & JUDITH THOMSON, MORAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL OBJECTIVITY

(1996). While the current discussion need not take a stance on moral relativism,
the parallel is useful in so far as in both situations the sole concern of the
individual evaluating the act in question is its conformity with certain local
standards, regardless of conformity with any broader or arguably more objective
standards. This issue of the conformity of normative judgements with local
rather than absolute standards is fundamentally distinguishable from the more
contentious claims of relativism found in the works of philosophers such as
Richard Rorty, who deny the sense of any form of reference to an independent,
non-relative world. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, The World Well Lost, in
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 3 (1982). For a critique of such views, see
ROBERT KIRK, RELATIVISM AND REALITY (1999).
34. The term "community" as used here should not be misunderstood, as it
refers solely to a form of social organization that is at some level normatively
cohesive. Thus it includes a purely business "community," in which participants
in a certain type of business interact repeatedly with one another and have, as a
result, developed certain substantive norms with which each actor is expected to
conform. See Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and
InterpretationRules: The Needfor a Dynamic Approach to ContractDisputes,
84 NEB. L. REv. 506 (2005) (arguing for the interpretation of contracts in
accordance with local norms rather than in accordance with rules developed at
the national or other large-scale level).
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However, a second variant of "institutional" authority should
also be acknowledged, as it can exist even when both of the parties
do not come from a single community with identifiable norms but
nonetheless recognize themselves as being subject to a particular
legal system. In such a situation the disputants do not value the
judge due to her representativeness of their own community but
because she herself is a representative member of the community
of judges in a particular legal system. That is, the judge's decision
is valued because it reflects appropriately the norms of reasoning
with which the legal rules in question are expected to be applied.3
Thus, for example, a decision by a highly regarded English judge
on French law will be less authoritative on the meaning of French
law regarding the issue in question than a decision by a merely
average French judge, so long as the latter judge is characteristic of
French judges.
This rationale for authority draws upon the notion that even
though judges within a single court structure may come from a
diversity of backgrounds, they are under professional pressure to
conform their legal interpretations to those of other courts in their
jurisdiction, particularly higher courts, whether they agree with the
higher courts or not.36 Moreover, many judges will experience a
form of socialization, as the constant interaction with the same
colleagues over a period of years leads to an increasing level of
35. It should, after all, be emphasized that what counts as proper legal
reasoning can vary from one jurisdiction to another. This can be due simply to
differing evaluations of the importance of certain principles (e.g., consistency
between decisions, objective fairness versus formal application of rules, etc.).
However, it can even extend to the point of reflecting fundamental cultural
differences in the way reasoning is approached. See, e.g., Jos Hornikx & Hans
Hoeken, Cultural Differences in the Persuasiveness of Evidence Types and
Evidence Quality, 4 COMM. MONOGRAPHs 443 (2007) (noting differences
between Dutch and French students in the means of evaluation of anecdotal,
statistical, causal, and expert evidence); Richard E. Nisbett et al., Culture and
Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REV.
291 (2001) (noting that East Asian individuals attend far more to context than
Western individuals, who attend primarily to the specific object under
discussion and the application to it of formal rules); Ara Norenzayan et. al.,
CulturalPreferencesfor Formal Versus Intuitive Reasoning, 26 COGNITIVE SC.
653 (2002) (noting that East Asian university students display a preference for
intuitive reasoning, while European and American students display a preference
for formal reasoning).
36. A "rational actor" explanation for judicial adherence to precedent is
offered in Eric Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in THE FALL
AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 61, 74-75 (Francis H. Buckley ed., 1999).
But see Gilat Levy, Careerist Judges and the Appeals Process, 36 RAND J.
ECON. 275 (2005) (arguing that judges wishing to promote their careers can be
expected to depart from precedent more often than their colleagues in order to
publicize their abilities).
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consensus on many, although not all, elements of the law." As a
result, even though the judgment delivered in a particular case is
simply a legal interpretation by a single judge, the disputants are
able to view it as an interpretation offered by the legal institution
as a whole rather than merely by the individual before whom the
dispute happens to have been brought.
What is distinctive about the "institutional" rationale for
authority, then, is that while the parties superficially recognize the
authority of the judge that delivers the decision, in reality what is
being respected is the authority of the court system as a whole,
with the judge delivering the decision only receiving deference
from the disputants because she is seen as an accurate guide to the
views that would be expressed by the broader community to which
she belongs. Consequently, while both the "insight" and
"expertise" rationales for authority primarily rely upon some
specific characteristics of the judge, the "institutional" rationale
refers only secondarily to the judge and primarily to the respect
accorded to the legal institution as a whole.
B. A PreliminaryObjection
Prior to applying this analysis to the question of the role of
authority in arbitration, one argument should be addressed that, if
correct, would effectively preclude authority from almost all
arbitral awards. Drawing as it does upon Raz's insightful work, the
analysis above adheres tightly to the "service conception of
authority." However, incorporating the "service conception" into a
social analysis of authority means that a judicial decision will only
be found authoritative when the parties receiving that decision
view the judge as providing them with a service. That is, the
parties must regard the judge as delivering a decision that is closer
to the correct answer than any decision they would have reached
themselves.
The complication this raises is that it would seem to follow that
the parties to the dispute must indeed believe that there is a preexisting correct answer to the question the judge is being asked to
decide. Otherwise there would be no substantive sense in which
the judge could be seen as providing the parties with a service.
37. Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Clare Leaver, Behaviour in Networks of
Collaborators:Theory and Evidence from the English Judiciary(Univ. of Oxford
Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 354, 2007), available at http://www.
economics.ox.ac.uk/Research/wp/pdf/paper354.pdf (finding empirical evidence,
based on a citation study, that judges are more likely to cite positively the
decisions of other judges with whom they have closely worked).
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They need not believe that there is a single correct answer to the
question being asked,38 but they must believe that there are at least
right and wrong answers, and that the judge's decision is
defensible as right, if they are to see him as providing the desired
service.
While this may initially seem to be a technical matter of legal
theory, raising the traditional dispute as to whether judges "make"
or "find" the law, 39 it achieves a practical importance precisely
because of the emphasis in the social analysis of authority on the
beliefs of the parties receiving the decision. Whatever the correct
answer to the theoretical question of whether judges "make" or
"find" the law, this argument maintains that if the parties to a
dispute believe that judges merely "make" the law, then they
simply will not see the judge deciding their case as providing them
with a service, as there is no "correct" answer that the judge is
capable of delivering.
The problem this raises is that it is clear that legally
sophisticated parties often simply do not view the judge's decision
in their case as representing anything more than a judgrent by an
individual with a particular place in a legal hierarchy. 40 That is,
they do not view the judge's decision as more correct than their
own views, or even those of a third party, but merely as
determining the application of the law in their case as a factual
matter. 4 ' Such "sophisticated" parties, then, view the judge as
merely an individual with the power to decide a case, who must be
convinced to decide it in a certain way, and not 42as an individual
with an ability to deliver an authoritative decision.
38. That is, the legal rule being applied may result in either a range of
correct answers or even a "vague" answer. In the latter case, one or more
answers is clearly right, and many answers are clearly wrong, but there also
exists a range of answers for which there is simply no means of determining
their correctness. As a result, a judge could legitimately select any of these
answers, and it would be impossible to criticize that answer as incorrect. On the
issue of "vagueness," see generally VAGUENESS: A READER (Rosanna Keefe &
Peter Smith eds., 1996).
39. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 655 (4th ed.
1873) (declaring the view that judges merely find, rather than make, the law to
be a "childish fiction").
40. See, e.g., E.W. THOMAS, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: REALISM,
PRAGMATISM, PRACTICAL REASONING AND PRINCIPLES 3 (2005) ("None, other
than the uninitiated who seemingly lack an understanding of the dynamic of the
common law, seriously question the fact that judges make law.").
41. In the classic quotation from Holmes, "The prophecies of what courts
will do, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,461 (1897).
42. By contrast, the conception of legal decision-making as effectively
involving the appointment of a legal specialist to determine how the law applies
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This argument is particularly important in the context of
international arbitration, as it is beyond question that parties
involved in international arbitrations will invariably qualify as
sophisticated legal actors.43 Consequently, were this view to be
accurate, and legally sophisticated parties simply did not view
legal decisions as authoritative, it would necessarily follow that
international arbitral awards could not be authoritative, and the
entire argument of this Article would be undermined.
However, the analysis performed above of the differing
rationales of the social analysis of authority makes it possible to
demonstrate that even if it is accepted that parties in international
arbitration do not believe that judges "find" rather than "make" the
law, arbitral awards can nonetheless be authoritative.
There is little question that the first rationale for authority, that
of "efficiency," does indeed fall prey to this argument. After all, if
there is no pre-existing correct answer to be reached, then it simply
cannot be the case that the judge is reaching a particular conclusion
faster than the parties themselves could have done. While the
decision of the judge may indeed coincide with what the parties
would theoretically have agreed upon, there is no necessary reason
why this should be so, and the judge's decision would have been
every bit as valid had it been radically different.
To the extent legal decisions are to have any authority for
sophisticated parties, then, this authority must derive from one of

to the facts of the case at hand can arguably be defended as existing in cases
involving "ordinary," legally unsophisticated parties who view a judge as part of
a legal system in which the judge researches the law laid down by the legislature
and then applies it to the facts of various cases. Parties with such a view of legal
decision-making can indeed be said to understand the judge as primarily a
mediator between the parties and the correct result, using her expertise to deliver
them closer to the legally correct conclusion than they would have been able to
reach. The ongoing prevalence of this view of the legal process can be seen
clearly in the consistent complaints about "judicial activism," which only make
sense against a background presumption that judges apply the law laid down by
the legislature rather than invent it themselves. See, e.g., PAUL CARRESE, THE
CLOAKING OF POWER (2003); RORY LEISHMAN, AGAINST JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

(2006).
43. It is, of course, not a logical impossibility that a legally unsophisticated
party would become involved in an international arbitration, but the likelihood is
low enough that it can for all practical purposes be ignored. But see Catherine A.
Rogers, The Arrival of the "Have-Nots" in International Arbitration, 8 NEV.
L.J. 341 (2007) (noting that the combination of increased small-scale crossborder transactions and the popularity of arbitration with companies involved in
international business serves to increase the probability that consumers and other
legally unsophisticated parties will find themselves in an international
arbitration).
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the "personal" rationales for authority: "insight," "expertise," or
"institutional." Indeed, as will be argued, all of these variants are
ultimately capable of providing the desired authority, as none
require that the parties possess any particular view regarding the
pre-existing correctness of a legal decision.
With respect to both the "insight" and "expertise" rationales for
authority, the parties are placing their reliance upon the ability of
the decision-maker to achieve enhanced insight into the dispute,
whether due to the judge's superior understanding of a technical,
non-legal issue, or merely because of the judge's ability to see a
fair conclusion that would have eluded the parties. Consequently,
the authority of the decision-maker does not derive from any
alleged enhanced insight into the law that is being applied to the
dispute, and as a result the parties' views on the pre-existence of
that law simply play no role in their evaluation of the
authoritativeness of the decision.
Similarly, the "institutional" rationale for authority is not
precluded by the objection. The first variant, according to which
the judge's decision will conform with the norms of a non-legal
social group, is unaffected by the parties' views on the conformity
of judicial decisions with pre-existing legal rules. Moreover, the
second variant only requires that the judge will reliably decide in a
manner consistent with other official actors within the legal
system. With respect to this second variant of the "institutional"
rationale, then, the question of whether the judge has "made" or
"found" the law becomes irrelevant so long as the parties can
observe that the norms within the broader legal system would lead
judges more generally to reach the same conclusion.
Consequently, the analysis of authority provided in this Article
offers a clear explanation of how even "legally sophisticated"
parties can view legal decisions as authoritative so long as they
view the judge in their case as having the necessary personal
abilities to deliver "insight," "expertise," or "institutional"
authority to her decisions. Similarly, then, arbitral awards can
possess at least some forms of authority, no matter how
sophisticated the parties in international arbitration may be.
Part III of this Article will now apply this analysis of authority
to traditional arbitration. It will clarify which versions of authority
lay behind the success of arbitration prior to its recent arrival as the
preferred form of international dispute resolution.
III. THE ROLE OF AuTHoRITY IN TRADITIONAL ARBITRATION
Arguably the single most defining feature of arbitration as a
confrontational dispute resolution procedure is the centrality of the
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arbitrators to the dispute resolution process. While there are no
strict procedural rules in accordance with which arbitrations must
be conducted, 44 and the degree to which arbitrations are subjected
to State control can also vary greatly, 45 the necessity of an
independent, third-party decision in arbitration unavoidably places
great emphasis upon the individuals selected to serve on an arbitral
panel.46 Indeed, while the degree of independence of arbitration
from State law enforcement has always been questionable,47 the
importance of the identity of the arbitrators and their power to
control the48 proceedings over which they preside have remained
consistent.
With respect to the authority of arbitral awards, the primary
virtue of traditional arbitration was the authority of the arbitrators
as seen by the parties.49 Whatever procedural rules were adopted
44. JULIAN D. M. LEw, LouKAs A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL,
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 522 (2003) ("Parties

are free to agree generally the procedure and, in any event, the arbitration
tribunal has the power to fix the procedure and determine procedural issues.").
45. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 30 (2d ed.
2001) ("Despite the hostility to international arbitration in some parts of the
world, most States in Europe, North America, and parts of Asia have adopted
legislation that provides effective and stable support for the arbitral process.").
46. For example, definitions of arbitration consistently include reference to
the participation of a third-party decision-maker. See, e.g., id. at I
("International arbitration is a means by which international disputes can be
definitively resolved, pursuant to the parties' agreement, by independent, nongovernmental decision-makers."); RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2000) ("Arbitration is

a dispute resolution mechanism whereby private parties, by way of agreement,
submit their existing or future disputes for binding resolution by an appointed
arbitrator or arbitrators.").
47.

See, e.g., JAMES ALAN JAFFE, STRIKING A BARGAIN: WORK AND

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN ENGLAND, 1815-1865, at 210 (2000) ("Western
Circuit assize records reveal that sometimes the parties themselves were allowed
to select their own arbitrators, while at other times arbitrators were appointed by
the court, but only after securing the consent of the parties."); Stephen E. Sachs,
From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval "Law
Merchant," 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 685 (2006) (arguing that contrary to the
views expressed by many commentators, courts were intimately involved in
medieval English arbitration).
48. William W. Park, The 2002 Freshfields Lecture-Arbitration'sProtean
Nature: The Value of Rules and the Risks ofDiscretion, 19 ARB. INT'L 279, 281
(2003) (noting "an emphasis on broad grants of procedural discretion to the
arbitrators").
49. Richard Garnett, International Arbitration Law: Progress Towards
Harmonisation,3 MELB. J.INT'L L. 400, 401 (2002) ("Rather than making use of
the court systems in their own countries-which were undeveloped,
procedurally backward and cumbersome-traders preferred to set up their own
tribunals, consisting of their own representatives who were familiar with the
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for the arbitration, the fully consensual and party-controlled nature
of arbitration meant that the award was delivered by a tribunal that
the parties saw as having genuine insight into their relationship and
the context in which they were operating.50
Indeed, precisely because of this insight of the arbitrators into
the relationship between the parties, particular emphasis was
placed on the arbitrators' role as settlers of the dispute rather than
as judicial arbiters.5 1 The disputants were usually in some form of
ongoing relationship and had selected as arbitrators individuals
with a connection to either the parties or the social context in
which they operated. 2 As a result, the decision of the tribunal was
viewed by the parties as not merely a rule-based legal judgment
but a proposed "resolution" of their dispute, intended either to
allow the relationship to continue or at least to allow both parties to
feel that justice had been served.53 Moreover, as the agreement to
arbitrate was reached post-dispute,5 4 and the procedural elements

types of disputes that arose. In this way, areas of recognised expertise could be
developed without excessive legal formality.").
50. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 55 (2008) ("The arbitrators themselves were often friends or
relatives of the parties.").
51. Id. at 55 ("Arbitrators were not bound by formal rules. Their aim was to
devise a compromise that would leave each party at least partially satisfied.");
Edward Powell, Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century
England, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 21, 24 (1984) ("[A]rbitration procedures, while
clearly influenced by legal forms in the fifteenth century, nevertheless remained
independent of court supervision in most cases, and continued to perform
functions to which the courts could not aspire: they could settle feuds, make
peace and restore harmonious social relations between disputing neighbors.").
52. MARYANNE KOWALESKI, LOCAL MARKETS AND REGIONAL TRADE IN
MEDIEVAL EXETER 219 (1995) ("[T]he litigants themselves usually chose one or
more arbitrators each, with an additional man jointly selected by both to serve as
referee. The arbitrators were usually merchants or artisans with some knowledge
In some arbitrations, the parties chose a cleric or
of the business at hand ....
even a member of the local nobility as the referee to help settle the dispute,
hoping perhaps that the prestige of the arbitrator would ensure the success of the
process."); ANTHONY MUSSON, MEDIEVAL LAW IN CONTEXT 92 (2001) ("In the
trade and business context . . . [p]arties were able to appoint their own
arbitrators (usually one or more for each side), which extended to drawing them
from a party's own nationality, and an additional unanimous choice to act as
referee.").
53. Powell, supra note 51, at 35 ("The arbitrators' role as peace-makers led
them inescapably towards framing a settlement that would be acceptable to both
sides in a dispute.").
54. JAFFE, supra note 47, at 213 ("While the scope of arbitration was
therefore quite broad by the end of the eighteenth century, the legal obligation to
pursue arbitration was construed relatively narrowly by the courts during this
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of the arbitration were determined with the mutual consent of the
parties, 55
even the losing party had reason to view the result as
binding.
Historically, then, the distinctiveness of arbitration from
litigation, and the reason it was selected by parties, involved not
the procedural flexibility so regularly touted today as a primary
virtue of contemporary international arbitration, 56 but rather the
esteem of the parties for the particular individuals serving as
arbitrators. As either prominent and experienced figures in the
same industry as the parties, or perhaps merely individuals both
parties respected, 5" the arbitrators were able to deliver a decision
that, although not always legally binding on the parties, 58 59was
nonetheless usually sufficient to preclude any further disputes.

period . . . nor could a party to an arbitration agreement be compelled by the
courts to refer a particular dispute to arbitrators.").
55. Michael Mustill, Comments on Fast-TrackArbitration, 10 J. INT'LARB.
121, 124 (1993) ("In the past, commercial people chose arbitration because they
wished their dispute to be resolved with the minimum of antagonism by
someone whom they trusted and respected, and whose award they would honour
as a matter of course because that was what they had agreed to do.").
56. Thomas Allen, Institutional Rules: Straitjacket or Scaffold?, in
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 79 (Martin Odams De Zylva &
Reziya Harrison eds., 2000) ("The procedural flexibility offered by arbitration
and arbitral institutions is a defining characteristic of this form of dispute
resolution and a quality which makes it an attractive alternative, especially in an
international commercial context, to traditional litigation."); Siegfried H. Elsing
& John M. Townsend, Bridging the Common Law-Civil Law Divide in
Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT'L 59, 65 (2002) ("One of the great strengths of
arbitration is its procedural flexibility, which permits the process to be tailored
to the particular needs of each case.").
57. MUSSON, supra note 52, at 92 ("In Exeter, merchants or artisans with
knowledge of the matter normally served as arbitrators, but it was quite usual to
have as an impartial umpire a respected local figure or a man of the cloth.");
Powell, supranote 51, at 27 ("Most arbitration awards were made locally, where
the disputes had arisen, and were negotiated by arbitrators from the same classes
as the disputants themselves-the magnates and gentry who dominated local
society.").
58. JAFFE, supra note 47, at 213 ("A particular weakness of arbitration,
outside those agreements registered with the courts under the terms of the 1698
Act, was the inability to compel the performance of awards."); Zeyad Alqurashi,
Arbitration Under the Islamic Sharia, TRANSNAT'L DiSP. MGMT. 2-3 (2004)
(discussing that both binding and non-binding awards existed under traditional
Islamic law).
59. This is not, though, to say that enforcement was never an issue in
traditional arbitration. See, e.g., Stephen Weinberger, Arbitrationof Disputes, in
MEDIEvAL FRANCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 61 (William W. Kibler ed., 1995) ("[I]n
order to ensure the stability of the settlement, great care was taken to have it
witnessed by as many people as possible. In some cases, a settlement might be
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In terms of the analysis of authority developed in this Article,
then, it will be argued here that traditional arbitration relied upon
either the "insight" of the arbitrators, their "expertise" in a certain
area, or their possession of a specific variety of "institutional"
authority tied to the social context in which the parties operated.
To address first the question of the "efficiency" rationale for
authority, it is clear that the arbitrators were not selected because
they were viewed as having an ability to reach the correct result
more efficiently than the parties. After all, while the arbitrators
may indeed have possessed the ability to reason quickly to reliable
conclusions, the emphasis in traditional arbitration placed on
achieving a resolution acceptable to both parties, rather than
delivering a formally correct and logically deduced conclusion,
meant that the arbitrators did not deliver awards based on strict
application of norms to facts but rather decisions judged to be both
appropriate and acceptable to the parties.60 Consequently, as there
was no pre-existing correct answer to which the arbitrators could
lead the parties, these parties could not view the award as
authoritative for reasons of "efficiency."
By contrast, the arbitrators could have been viewed by the
parties as authoritative due either to the belief that they possessed
the "insight" required to settle the parties' dispute in a mutually
satisfactory way or because of their perceived "expertise" in a
subject central to the dispute.
The situation with respect to the "institutional" rationale for
authority is somewhat more complex, although it is certainly true
that the arbitrators were usually not selected because their view

held in more than one location. Finally, the guarantors (fideiussores) often
committed themselves and their property to ensure the compliance of the
disputants to the settlement.").
60. Michael D. Myers, The Failureof Conflict Resolution and the Limits of
Arbitration in King's Lynn, 1405-1416, in TRADITIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS
IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 81, 83 (Douglas Biggs, Sharon D. Michalove &
A. Compton Reeves eds., 2001) ("[T]he arbitratusitself resulted from a process
of proposal and counter-proposal until a compromise solution acceptable to all
parties emerged."); Powell, supra note 51, at 35-36 ("Their function was not
that of a law court, to decide in favor of one party or another on the basis of a
body of legal rules and principles. Legal thinking might influence their
deliberations, but in fifteenth-century England, as in twelfth-century France,
arbitrators were concerned less to apply objective rules of decision than to
ensure that both parties were satisfied and that no one left empty-handed.");
Weinberger, supra note 59, at 61 ("[D]espite the weight of the evidence,
arbitrators most often recommended a compromise. With each side receiving
some satisfaction, there was less likelihood that the dispute would be
renewed.").
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was seen as an accurate indicator of the views of a larger and
ultimately more important legal institution. After all, even if
arbitrators have long experience with the law to be applied and
genuinely desire to apply it in the same way as a domestic court,
what is delivered in an arbitration is external to the law in question
and constitutes simply an interpretation of the law by individuals
whose opinion holds no specific relevance for the subsequent
development of that law.
By way of illustration, due to a mixture of the doctrine of
precedent and professional deference, any decision by a judge
within the English court system automatically becomes interwoven
into English law, even if it is not a decision that other judges
within that court system would have made. 6' That is, when an
English court delivers an inteigretation of a point of English law,
English law itself is changed. There is either support for a new
interpretation of that particular point of law, or there is further
confmnation that the dominant interpretation is correct. Decisions
by judges interpreting their domestic law, then, have "institutional"
authority not merely because they are reliable predictions of the
behavior of other courts within the same legal system but also
because they help determine the behavior they are predicting by
creating the law that other courts will then interpret.
By contrast, the same decision delivered by an arbitrator has a
fundamentally different relationship with the law that is being
interpreted. The courts of the jurisdiction whose law the arbitrator
applies may regard the decision as insightful, and thus persuasive,
but it has no precedential value and also receives no particular
professional deference by courts addressing other disputes. 63 In
61.

NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 151

(2008) ("[I]n certain contexts, such as the judicial context, precedent-following
might be accepted by decision-makers and others as a common standard of
correct adjudicative practice, deviation from which is likely to meet with
criticism or censure.").
62. "Changed" should here be understood as including situations in which
the decision in question merely affirms previous case law. Such a decision still
"changes" the law in so far as it adds to the support for the dominant rule.
63. Deference will certainly be given to the arbitrator's evaluation of
domestic law if an attempt is made to vacate the final award. ALAN REDFERN &
MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
ARBITRATION 424 (4th ed. 2004) ("The Model

INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

Law... sets the internationally

accepted standard for judicial control of international arbitration ....

[T]here is

no provision in the Model Law for challenging an award on the basis of mistake
of fact or law."). However, this deference merely reflects the parties' choice of
that arbitrator as the individual to determine their dispute and does not reflect
any judgement at all of the correctness of that final award as an interpretation of
the applicable law.
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short, its impact upon the deliberations of a court is equivalent to
that of an academic article, not of a court decision. Its conclusion
will be adopted and endorsed
if the decision is persuasive, but it
64
will be rejected if it is not.
Moreover, prior to the mid-twentieth century, courts often had
highly negative attitudes toward arbitration. 6 As an example,
under English law, even when both parties had indisputably agreed
to participate in arbitration, they both retained the right to revoke
their consent at any time prior to the delivery of the award.6 6 As a
result, there was simply no incentive for parties to select an
arbitrator who could reliably produce reasoned awards that
accurately predicted the reasoning of a particular court system, as
once a party realized that the law was not in its favor, it could
simply terminate the arbitration, thereby requiring the other party
to incur further time and expense by taking the dispute to court.
Instead, as discussed above, arbitrators concentrated upon
delivering an award that would be acceptable to both parties rather
than an award that was technically legally correct. In so far as an
arbitral award in traditional arbitration possessed authority derived
from the "institutional" rationale, then, it did not come from the
arbitrators' representativeness of the judges of a particular legal

system.
64. Indeed, citation of arbitral awards by courts is virtually unknown, even
in contemporary times.
65. BORN, supra note 45, at 29 ("Many nations historically regarded
international commercial arbitration with a mixture of suspicion and hostility.");
LEW ET AL., supra note 44, at 18 ("Even in England... arbitration was closely
controlled by the English courts. During this period there was significant
national court intervention in the arbitration process, including reviewing the
substantive decisions of the arbitrators."); Sarah Rudolph Cole & Kristen M.
Blankley, Arbitration, in THE HANDBOOK OF DIsPuTE RESOLUTION 320
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) ("Until Congress passed
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925 ... American courts refused to assist
the merchants in strengthening arbitration, holding instead that arbitration
agreements impermissibly divested the courts ofjurisdiction.").
66. James Jaffe, The Limits of Justice and Fairness: Expanding the Scope of
Arbitration in Britain and India during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth
Centuries 5 (July 2007) (unpublished draft paper), available at http://www.law.
harvard.edu/programs/ames foundation/BLHC07/Jaffe The Limits of Justice
and Fairness.pdf ("While a submission to arbitration was considered by the
courts to be an unenforceable contract, it was at the same time also considered to
be a mandate, which indicated that it could be revoked at any time before the
award was made. A standard nineteenth-century treatise noted, for example, that
oral agreements to arbitrate could be aborted simply by announcing to the
arbitrator: 'I discharge you from proceeding any further.' In the end, therefore,
arbitration awards could only be secured if both parties fully agreed to proceed
to arbitration and accepted the legitimacy of the entire arbitration procedure."
(citation omitted)).
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However, this does not mean that all institution-based authority
was lacking in traditional arbitral awards. Rather, it merely
indicates that the institution serving as the basis for the authority in
question could not be a legal one. For example, the arbitrators may
have been selected due to their membership in, and
representativeness of, a particular social group as a means of the
winninq party gaining validation of its behavior from that social
group. If, for example, highly regarded members of a local
trading community sat as arbitrators in a dispute between two other
members of that community, any decision they delivered based on
the norms of that community would provide more validation
within that community of the correctness of the victorious party's
conduct than would any decision by an external body, including
the national courts.
Consequently, traditional arbitrators were able to deliver
authority through the "institutional" rationale, but only when there
was a common social group shared by the parties and the
arbitrator's decision reflected the norms of that group.
Drawing these conclusions together, then, it is clear that the
authority of a traditional arbitral award was inherently personal,
relying upon the possession by the arbitrators of certain personal
characteristics. They may have been viewed as insightful or as
possessing a certain expertise, but even when it was the
"institutional" rationale for authority that was operative, this
authority was only possible because the arbitrators were personally
representative of a particular social group rather than because they
possessed a certain
place in an institutional hierarchy, such as a
68
court system.

Part IV of this Article will build upon this analysis of the place
of authority in traditional arbitration by addressing recent changes
in both the role of arbitrators and the procedures used to select
them. It will argue that these changes have ultimately deprived
contemporary arbitral awards of the authority possessed by awards
delivered in traditional arbitration.
67. As noted previously, it should be remembered that "social group" here
refers not just to ethnic or political groupings but to any social grouping with a
coherent normative set of rules governing conduct, including groups of
consistently interacting businesses. See supra note 34.
68. This does not mean that hierarchy was entirely irrelevant, of course,
because an individual highly placed in the relevant social structure was more
likely to be viewed as authoritative than was an individual lower down in that
hierarchy. However, the validation sought ultimately depended on the individual
being viewed as representative, and a highly placed individual who was not
regarded by the parties as representative of the norms of the group would
nonetheless be incapable of delivering the requisite authority to the award.
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V. THE Loss OF AUTHORITY IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION

This part of the Article will argue that the loss of authority in
contemporary international arbitration, as illustrated by the
increasing willingness of parties to challenge awards, derives from
the adoption of procedures that usually operate to preclude
precisely the types of authority that underlay the success of
traditional arbitration. Moreover, while contemporary international
arbitration has been deprived of the sources of authority that
traditional arbitration possessed, no alternative means of delivering
authority to arbitral awards have been adopted. As a result,
contemporary international arbitration is simply structurally
incapable of delivering authoritative awards. 69 It will be argued
here that this situation is largely attributable to the effect of certain
procedures currently adopted in international arbitration on the role
and standing of arbitrators and the interaction of those procedures
with the increased "judicialization" of contemporary international
arbitration.70
A. Problems Derivedfrom the ArbitratorSelection Processes
In traditional arbitration, parties agreed to arbitrate after their
dispute had arisen and proceeded to a hearing only when they were
both able to agree on an arbitrator or arbitrators to hear their
dispute. 71 The contemporary spread of arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism, however, has made this fully consensual
approach comparatively rare. Instead, contemporary arbitration
agreements are predominantly signed at the time of the initial
contract, before any dispute has arisen, and are designed to be

69. This does not mean, of course, that an authoritative award can never be
delivered in international arbitration but merely that the existence of that
authority will depend on facts specific to that case (e.g., both parties agree on a
single arbitrator whom they both respect), so that it cannot be attributed to
anything inherent in international arbitration itself
70. 2 KLAUS PETER BERGER, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 303 (2006) ("It is particularly in major, multi-million
dollar arbitrations that the informal atmosphere, which has long been the main
feature of international commercial arbitration and has made arbitration an
important factor in ADR, has given way to confrontation and litigation tactics,
hitherto known only from proceedings before national courts. Over the past
decades, the arbitral process has undergone a fundamental transformation which
is often characterized as the 'judicialization' of arbitration ....
(internal cross-

reference omitted)).
71.

JAFFE, supra note 47, at 213.
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72
broad enough to catch a wide range of potential future disputes.
As a result, arbitration agreements usually include few details
beyond the mere consent to arbitration, leaving details such as the
identity of the arbitrators to be determined once a request for
arbitration has been lodged.73
Unsurprisingly, this has made the traditional fully consensual
approach to arbitrator selection entirely unworkable for most
contemporary arbitrations. After all, once the request for
arbitration has been made a significant dispute has arisen between
the parties, and attempts to negotiate an amicable dispute will have
failed. Consequently, just as parties to a litigation will maneuver to
ensure that their case is heard in what they view to be the most
favorable jurisdiction for their own arguments, many parties will
regard the appointment of an arbitral panel not as a means of
securing a fair and independent tribunal to impartially decide a
dispute between the parties but rather as a means of ensuring that
the tribunal is composed of individuals more likely to decide in
their favor. 74

72. Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark, Commentary, in
SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 2, at 19.
73. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, TECHNIQUES FOR CONTROLLING TIME
AND COSTS IN ARBITRATION: REPORT FROM THE ICC COMMISSION ON
ARBITRATION 1 (2007), http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ TimeCost E.pdf

("Simple, clearly drafted arbitration clauses will avoid uncertainty and disputes
as to their meaning and effect. They will minimize the risk of time and costs
being spent on disputes regarding, for example, the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal or the process of appointing arbitrators.").
74. YvEs DERAINS & ERIC A. SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF
ARBITRATION 120 (2d ed. 2005) ("Parties therefore often expend considerable
effort in seeking to identify an arbitrator whom they hope may be 'sympathetic'
to their position in an arbitration."); Keith E. W. Mitchell, Arbitrator Selection
and Appointment Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, in NAFTA
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 314 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004) ("As 'you

will want someone who will be philosophically receptive to the theory of your
case and to your arguments' . . . 'you will need to analyse your case to

determine the crucial issues to be decided, with a particular emphasis on the
strategies and arguments you will use to get past the sticky issues."' (quoting
Elizabeth T. Baer, Selecting and Challenging Arbitrators in International
Commercial Arbitration (Oct. 17, 2000) (unpublished manuscript))); id at 313
("Generally, a party attempts to select an arbitrator predisposed to a favorable
consideration of their case, but not legally biased such as to result in
disqualification."). On a more specific level, one practitioner has listed the
following "[a]ttributes for party-appointed arbitral candidates: ...

Philosophical

predisposition to your case: [(1)] previous arbitral decisions for or against
claimant and for what sums; [(2)] previous procedural or jurisdictional decisions
similar to those likely to arise in this case; [(3)] written favorably on issues
likely to arise." Earl McLaren, Effective Use of International Commercial
Arbitration: A Primerfor In-House Counsel, 19 J. INT'L ARB. 473 (2002).
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Acknowledging this reality, contemporary international arbitral
institutions have adopted a mechanism for selecting arbitrators that
is intended to avoid the most likely problems. While arbitration
can proceed with only a single arbitrator who is mutually agreed
upon by both parties, the contentious nature of much contemporary
international arbitration means that agreement between the parties
on a single arbitrator will often be unlikely. As a result, if such
agreements were necessary, many arbitrations would simply fail to
take place, and parties either would be forced into court litigation
or an "appointing authority" 75 would76 simply impose an arbitrator
of its own choosing upon the parties.
To avoid these difficulties, the dominant approach to arbitrator
selection taken in contemporary international arbitration requires a
panel of three arbitrators, rather than a sole arbitrator.77 Under this
system, each party gets broad freedom, restricted solely by
constraints on the ultimate fairness of the proceeding, to select and
nominate an arbitrator. 78 Those two arbitrators will then usually
agree upon the selection of a third arbitrator to chair the panel.79
The rationale behind this approach from the perspective of the
authority of the resulting award is that this selection mechanism
will serve to generate an authoritative panel by ensuring that each
party has one arbitrator who it can view as possessing the ability to
deliver authority to the award. Consequently, when the three
arbitrators confer and agree upon a decision, each party has a
reason to accept the result because the arbitrator each recognizes as
having the requisite authority has concurred in the decision.
75. An appointing authority is an individual or institution empowered to
select arbitrators for an arbitration when selection by the parties has failed to
occur. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 63, at 192-94.
76. While the selection of an arbitrator by an appointing authority at least
ensures that an arbitration occurs, the lack of direct participation by the parties
and the lack of detailed research by the appointing authority into the ideal
arbitrator for the arbitration means such a process will rarely result in an
arbitrator being selected who is viewed by the parties as capable of delivering an
authoritative award.
77. MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 117 (2008) ("In international arbitrations, however,
there is frequently a preference for three arbitrators ....
").
78. The specific constraints adopted vary between jurisdictions, but in broad
terms arbitrators are expected to be both "independent" of the parties and
"impartial" between them. See generally Christopher Koch, Standards and
Proceduresfor Disqualifying Arbitrators, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 325 (2003); Leon
Trakman, The Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators Reconsidered, 10
INT'L ARB. L. REV. 124 (2007).
79. BORN, supra note 45, at 616 ("Typically, each party (in a two-party
dispute) nominates an arbitrator and the two party-nominated arbitrators (or 'coarbitrators') endeavor to agree upon a presiding arbitrator (or 'chairman').").
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Moreover, even if all three arbitrators do not agree, absent a
particularly vociferous dissent from its nominated arbitrator, 80 the
losing party still has reason to accept the panel's decision because,
though its arbitrator may disagree with the resolution, the
disagreement likely turns on a point of interpretation rather than a
fundamental disagreement.
On its face this is an eminently well-designed procedure,
ensuring that both parties have some reason to view the arbitral
panel as authoritative and avoiding the difficulties of requiring
genuine agreement on the identity of each arbitrator. However, it
becomes highly problematic when it is placed in the context of an
increasingly litigious approach to arbitration at the international
level.
Contemporary international arbitrators are overwhelmingly
highly regarded individuals, particularly at the higher levels of
international arbitration.8 ' But, from the perspective of an
arbitrator's ability to deliver authority to an award, the important
question is not whether the arbitrator concerned has some form of
general social or professional prestige but whether the specific
parties involved in the arbitration view that particular arbitrator as
capable of delivering a decision to which they will be content to
bind themselves. Historically, as discussed above, this authority
was assured by the fully consensual, post-dispute nature of
arbitration, as the arbitrators were selected by agreement of the
parties specifically to resolve the particular dispute in which the
parties were involved. However, the procedure operating in
contemporary international arbitration, as just described, is poorly
designed for the purpose of delivering an arbitral tribunal with
genuine authority for the parties.
An important obstacle to the selection of an authoritative
arbitral panel arises under the system currently adopted because if
each party nominates one arbitrator, it will almost always be the
80. Dissents are rare in international arbitration. DERAINS & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 74, at 308 ("Indeed, the use of dissenting opinions has not generally
been encouraged in international arbitration."); Drahozal & Naimark, supra note
72, at 260 ("[T]he vast majority of ICC awards are unanimous (at least on their
face)."). On the legal status of dissenting opinions in international arbitration,
see JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF
INTERNATIONALARBITRATION 673-79 (2007).

81. For example, admission to the International Centre for Dispute
Resolution (ICDR) International Roster of Neutrals, from which the ICDR
suggests arbitrators to parties, requires, inter alia, a "[m]inimum of 15 years of
senior-level business or professional experience." American Arbitration
Association, Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the ICDR International
Roster of Neutrals, http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4495 (last visited Oct. 6,
2008).
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case that the non-nominating party will regard the other party's
nominee with some level of skepticism, or even suspicion. It is,
after all, not necessary to question the impartiality of an arbitrator
to acknowledge that when the other party has done its job properly,
its nominated arbitrator will have been selected precisely because
of some substantive leaning that the nominating party believes will
be favorable to its position. Even in such a case, then, when there
is no actual bias involved, the arbitrator is simply not substantively
impartial but is known by the party that did not nominate her to be
antagonistic toward some central element of its case.
Consequently, in contrast with traditional arbitration, the arbitrator
is simply not an individual 83
to whom both parties would have
agreed to submit their dispute.
To return to the analysis of authority derived above, the
arbitrator in question may be an expert in the subject matter of the
dispute and hence potentially capable of delivering an authoritative
award under the "expertise" rationale. However, if she holds
substantive views starkly incompatible with those held by the party
that did not nominate her, that party will not regard her as a
genuine expert with respect to the issues in the case at hand but
merely as a specialist who is, at best, simply mistaken. Similarly,
authority will be unavailable under the "insight" rationale because
if the arbitrator works from presumptions rejected by the nonnominating party, that party will be unwilling to accept her
conclusions as displaying genuine insight rather than mere bias.
Finally, while the arbitrator may well come from a community of
importance to both parties in the dispute, and potentially therefore
be able to deliver an award under the "institutional" rationale, if
her views represent a subsection of that community to which the
non-nominating party does not belong, then she is not genuinely
representative of a community shared by the two parties and hence
cannot deliver an award under the "institutional" rationale.
It might be argued that while each party will have a single
arbitrator who cannot convey authority to the award, two
arbitrators will always remain, one of whom was directly selected
by the party in question, with the other having been selected by
that party's chosen arbitrator. Consequently, because at least one
of those individuals must support an award for it to receive the
82. See supra note 74.
83. Even in traditional arbitration, of course, a party might nominate an
arbitrator to the tribunal that held views that were very unfavorable to the other
party. However, the ability of parties in traditional arbitration to refuse to
participate in the proceedings, despite having entered into an arbitration
agreement, meant that nomination of such an arbitrator would be
counterproductive and so was unlikely to happen.
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required majority approval, an authoritative award should still be
deliverable.
There are, however, two difficulties with this argument. First,
the losing party may itself have approached arbitrator selection
from a litigious perspective, nominating an arbitrator it believed
would be friendly to its case rather than one it saw as genuinely
authoritative. Indeed, in most contemporary international
arbitrations the party-nominated arbitrator will actually have been
selected by the party's lawyers, not by the party itself. But,
whether the party or its attorneys was responsible for the selection
of the party-nominated arbitrator, if he was selected from a
litigious perspective rather than with a view to his genuine
authoritativeness, the participation by either the party-nominated
arbitrator or the Chair of the three-arbitrator panel in an
unfavorable award will merely indicate to the party that it made a
poor strategic choice of arbitrator. It will give that party no reason
to believe that the award delivered was indeed appropriate.
Moreover, even when the party has indeed nominated an
arbitrator that it views as authoritative, all the possible authority of
the resulting award will of necessity be derived from the
participation in the award of that individual arbitrator, not from the
Chair of the panel. The party, after all, has not selected the Chair
but has at best consented to a negotiated agreement on an
individual arbitrator that is acceptable to both parties. That is,
though the Chair will certainly be inoffensive to both parties, she is
unlikely to hold real authority for either of them. While the
requirement for agreement on the identity of the Chair may appear
to resemble agreement upon a single arbitrator in traditional
arbitration, it is important to note the starkly different context in
contemporary arbitration. In traditional arbitration neither party
was obligated to arbitrate, but both agreed to do so because each
viewed arbitration as advantageous to its position and thought that
the specific arbitrator agreed upon was acceptable. Consequently,
both parties had an incentive to cooperate in selecting an arbitrator
genuinely acceptable to both parties because unless both parties
agreed to the appointment, there would be no arbitration. In
contemporary international arbitration, on the other hand,
arbitration has usually become mandatory before the identity of
arbitrators has been discussed,8 and if either party refuses to agree
84. This is because the agreement to arbitrate will have been included in the
contract underlying the dispute. Consequently, arbitration will have become
mandatory as soon as validly invoked by one of the parties, and only
subsequently will the parties address the question of the identities of the
arbitrators.
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upon the Chair of the arbitration panel, an individual will simply
be selected by the relevant appointing authority, and the arbitration
will progress as normal.85 Consequently, parties have no incentive
to take the time to agree upon an individual genuinely authoritative
for both sides, as each party has veto power over any choice
genuinely desired by the other party, as well as an incentive to use
it.86 Ultimately, then, the two parties will simply settle upon an
individual who is inoffensive to both but authoritative for neither.
The Chair of the panel, then, will very rarely be able to deliver
any authority to the award herself,87 leaving all authority to be
delivered by the party's own nominated arbitrator. One important
consequence of this situation is that if a party has nominated an
arbitrator it sees as genuinely authoritative and that arbitrator
dissents, the party in question has no reason to view the resulting
award as authoritative. Moreover, as dissenting opinions are
extremely rare in arbitration,8 8 even an award in which the party's
nominated arbitrator concurs has limited ability to produce
authority, as it is unclear whether the arbitrator indeed endorsed
the decision or merely failed to author a dissent.
Thus, only if a party has approached the arbitral selection
process with no particular eye for strategic advantage, and the
arbitrator the party has selected explicitly acquiesces in the award,
will that party have any reason to regard the award as authoritative.
Obviously this does not describe the conventional situation in
contemporary international arbitration.
One other variation on arbitrator selection found in
international arbitration is also worth addressing, if only to
emphasize that it does not provide a solution to the problem just
discussed. While the standard process in arbitrations in which
significant sums are in dispute involves each party freely selecting
its own arbitrator, smaller arbitrations will often be undertaken by
a single arbitrator who has been selected by the parties from a list
prepared by an arbitral institution.89 This may initially seem to
85. BORN, supra note 45, at 616 ("Where the co-arbitrators are unable to
reach agreement, an 'appointing authority' is delegated authority to select the
presiding arbitrator.").
86. The objecting party will, after all, have a justifiable concern that an
arbitrator viewed by the other party as authoritative will likely have a strong
enough understanding of that party's views that she will be unfavorable to the
objecting party.
87. Those rare situations occur when both parties do indeed agree upon an
arbitrator that they both view as authoritative.
88. See supra note 80.
89. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 63, at 188-89 ("A variation on this
system, sometimes used by arbitral institutions, particularly the ICDR and the
Netherlands Arbitration Institute, and by appointing authorities under the
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resemble traditional arbitration, as the individual selected to serve
as arbitrator has received the explicit consent of both parties.
However, in such a situation the parties have selected the arbitrator
not through any particular personal familiarity with him, or even
after detailed research on his suitability, but merely because he
appears prima facie suitable and has received the endorsement of
an arbitral institution. Thus, such an individual simply cannot have
the kind of standing for the parties necessary to deliver an
authoritative award. 9°r
B. The Three-ArbitratorPanel as DisplacedPartyNegotiation
Although the problems just described with the dominant
selection method for a three-arbitrator panel are serious, it is worth
noting that the three-arbitrator panel is quite capable of delivering
an authoritative award. The problem, that is, does not derive from
the use of three arbitrators to resolve the dispute but from the
combination of the current means of selecting the participating
arbitrators and the highly litigious context in which that procedure
currently operates. The three-arbitrator panel is in fact a highly
desirable feature of contemporary arbitration, and this part of the
Article is devoted to explaining a means by which a threearbitrator panel can deliver awards possessing authority under the
"insight" rationale, as well as discussing why this is not currently
being done.
As noted earlier, although a three-arbitrator panel theoretically
allows arbitrators to be picked to represent both parties' views, if
one or both parties approaches the selection process with a goal of
maximizing tactical advantage, neither party ultimately has any
reason to view the panel as genuinely addressing the perspectives
of both sides in an attempt to resolve the dispute. Consequently,
UNCITRAL Rules, is that the institution sends out the same list of names to
each party .... Each party returns the list, deleting any name to which it objects

and grading the remainder in order of preference. The appointing authority then
chooses an arbitrator from the list, in accordance with the order of preference
indicated by the parties.").
90. There might be instances in which the parties develop sufficient respect
for the arbitrator during the course of the arbitration that the resulting award is
indeed authoritative. However, such instances would obviously be extremely
rare due to the limited and substantively restricted degree of contact between the
parties and the arbitrator during the course of the arbitration. Arbitrators will, in
the course of a proceeding, have sufficient opportunity to dispel concerns
regarding their competence, but it will be a rare proceeding in which enough
substantive and varied interaction between the parties and arbitrator will occur
to enable the arbitrator actually to become authoritative.
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the losing party has no reason to see the award it has received as
possessing any kind of authority.
What needs to be emphasized, however, is not the current
reality of the operation of three-arbitrator panels but the underlying
goal of such panels, even if this goal is not currently being brought
into reality. The rationale for the three-arbitrator panel, after all,
does not depend solely on the reduction of uncertainty that comes
from requiring at least two arbitrators to agree on the final award
rather than the parties subjecting themselves to the potential quirks
of a single arbitrator. 9 ' Instead, the desirability of a three-arbitrator
panel primarily arises from the way it allows each party to select
an arbitrator and thereby have its substantive views and
perspective represented on the panel.92
A minimalist interpretation of this structure might argue that it
is simply a means of ensuring that each party has one
representative on the panel whose decision it can accept, thereby
ensuring that the award has some level of authoritativeness for
both parties. However, as just argued, such an interpretation is
ultimately untenable, as the simple use of a three-arbitrator panel
will not result in an authoritative award.
A stronger rationale for the use of a three-arbitrator panel can,
however, be seen through an emphasis on the notion that parties
will select which arbitrator to nominate not based on some
generalized respect that they have for the individual in question but
because that arbitrator holds certain substantive views that they
wish to have represented on the panel. As already discussed, within
the context of parties selecting arbitrators for tactical gain, attempts
to pick an arbitrator for his substantive views can actually
undermine the authoritativeness of the resulting award. But, when
the selection is made in a good faith attempt to ensure that the
party's viewpoint is fairly represented in the panel's deliberations,
an entirely different situation results.
In this scenario, the panel moves beyond being just a result of
tactical choices by parties attempting to ensure a favorable result
and becomes a deliberative body that includes two individuals who
can be expected to advance the views substantively held by each of
the parties, with a third individual who holds substantive views at
least acceptable to both parties.
91. MOSES, supra note 77, at 117 ("[I]t is generally believed that the award
is more likely to be within the parties' expectations when considered by three
arbitrators, and that unusual or inexplicable awards are less likely to occur.").
92. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 63, at 185 ("The advantage to a party
of being able to nominate an arbitrator is that it gives the party concerned a
feeling of confidence in the arbitral tribunal. Each party will have at least one
'judge of his choice' to listen to its case.").
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In an ideal situation, then, a three-arbitrator panel can be seen
not as a judicial body appointed to rationally determine which
party should win the dispute but as a form of displacement of the
negotiation of the parties. Once the arbitration has commenced, the
parties of necessity will have adopted oppositional and even
antagonistic stances, and there will therefore be significant
obstacles to the parties discussing their dispute seriously with a
view to achieving a settlement. Moreover, it is likely that some
form of settlement negotiation has previously taken place, but a
resolution acceptable to both parties was not reached.
Under the view of a three-arbitrator panel proposed here,
however, the panel will not only deliberate about the case as
presented by the parties, but it will do so from perspectives
representing the substantive views of the parties. Importantly, this
discussion will take place without the personal entrenchment in
one's own perspective that characterizes parties to a dispute.
Consequently, when the award is delivered, it will represent not
just a determination by an objective judicial body but rather a form
of negotiated settlement between the parties, arrived at with the
panel operating as proxies for the parties at a time when the parties
are likely unable to undertake substantive negotiations due to the
antagonism between them.
This is not to say that the "negotiations" undertaken by the
arbitrators will be the same as those that might have been
undertaken by the parties. 93 While the arbitrators will represent the
substantive views of the parties, they are ultimately selected to
play a role in a legal dispute resolution system. Consequently, their
ability to represent the views of the parties will relate to legal
positions rather than the more personal arguments that might be
made in direct party-to-party negotiations. The displacement of
negotiations from the parties to the arbitrators, then, involves not
just a change in the individuals involved in the discussions but also
a change in the discussions themselves. 94 Personal, non-legal
concerns are replaced by law-based formulations of the same
considerations, and the "settlement" that is ultimately reached is a
compromise between legal stances rather than between personal
considerations.
93. After all, even well-selected arbitrators will not have the depth of
understanding of a party's specific views and position to enable him to fully
represent that party in discussions. My thanks to Alan Rao for highlighting the
need to make this point.
94. The type of change involved in moving from a non-legal to a legal
discussion is well captured in Niklas Luhnann, Law as a Social System, 83 Nw.
U. L. REv. 136 (1988).
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In terms of the analysis of authority performed in this Article, a
three-arbitrator panel functioning in this manner will deliver
authority to its award under the "insight" rationale because the
decision will have been reached by a panel that understood and
seriously considered the views of both sides to the dispute. Just as
a directly negotiated settlement is authoritative for the parties
because it encapsulates to an acceptable level both of their points
of view on the subject matter in dispute, this settlement-by-arbitralproxy is also authoritative for ultimately the same reasons.
However, as desirable a situation as this may be, a major
obstacle exists to the functioning of any arbitral panel in this
manner, arising from the contemporary judicialization of the role
of the arbitrator. Under the dominant view in contemporary
international arbitration, all arbitrators, including those nominated
by the parties, are obligated to achieve a detachment from the
parties in order to act as "objective" judges of the dispute rather
than as objective proxies for the parties in a settlement negotiation.
In the litigious context of contemporary arbitration this
judicialization is indeed a desirable characteristic in arbitrators
because it is an effective means of minimizing bias on their part.
But, the justification for the judicialization of arbitrators ultimately
rests upon a fundamental confusion between neutrality and
detachment, in which the former is sought, but by insisting upon
the latter. That is, it is an unquestionable tenet of contemporary
international arbitration that all arbitrators on a panel, including the
two party-nominated arbitrators, must be neutral between the
parties and cannot favor the party that nominated them simply
because of that nomination. 95 This stance is clearly correct, as any
other system would merely result in a transportation of the
antagonism between the parties into the panel's deliberations and
ensure that the award, when delivered, was not based on reasons
that would be acceptable to both parties.
Yet, while the neutrality of arbitrators is essential, detachment
of the arbitrators from the parties is not. One can certainly be
neutral between two people because one knows or cares nothing
about them, thereby leaving one free to decide their dispute on
purely logical or otherwise rational grounds. 96 However, one can
95. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 46, at 82 ("An arbitrator has a duty of
impartiality in all dealings regarding the arbitration.").
96. See, e.g., the impartiality that was memorably described by one French
judge concerning a case involving a famous English cricketer: "It is true that I
have never heard of your Mr. Boycott or even seen a game of cricket. It is like
American baseball, isn't it? But for me it is better that way as it meant I was
completely impartial." ROBERT STEvENs, THE ENGLISH JUDGES: THEIR ROLE IN
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also be neutral because she knows or cares deeply but equally
about both sides to the dispute, or because she knows or cares
deeply about one side but also cares deeply that a just and fair
decision be made rather than simply one favorable to the party she
knows.
This is an important distinction to make because very rarel
will any legal dispute be resolvable on purely logical grounds.9
Legal disputes by their nature involve large amounts of vagueness,
conflicting perspectives, and sincerely argued disputes over the
comparative worth of differing elements of the underlying
relationship. The best decision in such a context does not come
from an individual detached from the parties attempting to
logically and fairly apply abstract legal rules, as though there was a
means of fairly and rationally deducing the correct answer to the
dispute. Rather, the best decision comes from an individual or
group that understands the perspectives involved in the dispute and
therefore uses the applicable abstract legal rules in a flexible
manner befitting the context of the dispute and the parties
involved. It was, after all, precisely the arbitrator's familiarity with
the parties and commitment to a mutually satisfactory solution that
was one of the great attractions of traditional arbitration and a
primary reason why traditional arbitral awards were regarded as
authoritative by the parties.
The contemporary judicialization of the role of the arbitrator,
however, as manifested in the implausibility of seeing any
contemporary three-arbitrator panel as constituting a form of
displaced negotiation between the parties, has resulted in the loss
of this virtue. Instead, the insistence on the detachment of the
arbitrators from the parties not only fails to deliver authority to the
resulting award but indeed eliminates the possibility of that award
receiving the "insight"-based authority available from an award
delivered by a panel of neutral-but-involved arbitrators.
Part VII of this Article will address, among other things, a
means by which the traditional connection between arbitrators and
parties can be restored, enabling the delivery of awards with
"insight"-based authority but without also creating an unacceptable
risk of bias on the part of arbitrators. The next part of the Article,
however, will address the possibility that even though arbitrators
are now rarely able to deliver authority to an arbitral award, the
development of contemporary international arbitration has resulted

A CHANGING CONSTITION 82 n.20 (2002) (quoting S. Pook, The Woman Who
Hit Boycott for Six, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 13, 1998).

97. See supranote 19.
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in the creation of an institution that can deliver the desired
authority, much like a structured court system can provide the
authority of a court judgment even if the parties do not regard the
judge himself as authoritative in any particular manner.
C. The Relevance ofAuthority to CorporateActors
Although the argument presented here is based upon the ability
of arbitrators to deliver awards that will be authoritative for the
parties receiving them, it might be argued that this issue has little
relevance in the contemporary corporate world.
While in traditional arbitration disputes centered on differences
between individuals-even though framed in a business contextcontemporary international arbitration is dominated by disputes
between large corporate actors, in which it is rare for a single
individual to be both the decision-maker in the corporation and the
chief recipient of the corporation's profits. 98 Instead, any decision
regarding whether an award should be complied with or resisted
will be made by an individual whose job is not to make decisions
in accordance with his personal beliefs but to maximize the
corporation's profits. 99 Consequently, it matters little if such an
individual personally finds the arbitral award in question
authoritative if he also recognizes that his corporation will be
better served by challenging the award than by merely accepting it.
However, although this is an important complication to
recognize, it does not ultimately undermine the argument presented
here, as even corporations pursuing their own self-interest will
benefit from abiding by demonstrably authoritative awards. While
there are certainly individual corporations large enough that they
need to pay little attention to the views of the companies with
which they transact, l00 the overwhelming majority of corporations
have a vested interest in maintaining a reputation as a desirable
contracting partner. This means, though, that such corporations

98.

Margaret M. Blair, The Neglected Benefits of the Corporate Form:

Entity Status and the Separation of Asset Ownership from Control, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM ORGANIZATION 46 (Anna Grandori ed.,

2004) ("[S]hareholders in widely traded corporations should not be regarded as
the 'owners' of corporations since they yield nearly all of the important control
rights and other indicia of ownership to boards of directors.").
99. Such is the case whether the decision is made by corporate counsel, the
CEO, or an individual in some other position of power.
100. This is because these corporations are so central to the relevant market
that the companies in question will be forced to do business with them no matter
how they behave, or else be sidelined in the market.
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have good reason to avoid gaining a reputation as willing to go to
any extent to win a dispute.
What is at issue in this context is the nature of the role of
contract enforcement in commercial contracting. Even in the more
"litigious" of Western business communities, contracts are not
entered into with comfort in the knowledge that if any disputes
arise the contract can simply be enforced through litigation or
arbitration. Any form of enforcement, after all, involves both
litigation-related expenses and lost business opportunities.
Consequently, while the enforceability of a contract is an important
consideration, ultimately contracts are entered into in the hope that
they will not need to be enforced.
Once this is recognized, though, the importance even for
corporate actors of abiding by demonstrably authoritative arbitral
awards becomes clear.' 0 A party that cannot be trusted to abide by
any arbitral award, but that will instead always take the
opportunity to resist enforcement of an award it has not won, is
simply unreliable as a contractual partner. Any party considering
contracting with such a partner will be aware that it cannot merely
rely upon its own efforts to abide by its obligations under the
contract but must instead expect that if a dispute arises it will have
to expend significantly more money enforcing a contract with this
party than with a corporation that is willing to abide by
demonstrably authoritative awards.
Accordingly, while the analysis of the relevance of authority to
corporate actors is different than that of the relevance of authority
to individuals, even corporate actors have reason to abide by
demonstrably authoritative awards. Thus, the question of what
makes awards authoritative remains just as relevant for corporate
actors as for individuals.
V. THE UNAVAILABILITY OF INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO
REPLACE THE AUTHORITY OF ARBITRATORS

Acknowledging the loss of arbitrator authority in contemporary
arbitration, it might nonetheless be argued that the observable
increased drive toward procedural uniformity within international
arbitration is itself a means of securing authority for the results of
an arbitration by effectively creating an "institution" that is
101. The term "demonstrably authoritative" is used here because the concern
in this context will ultimately not be with whether a given individual within the
corporate actor finds the award authoritative, but with whether individuals in
other corporations will see it as authoritative for an individual in that corporate
actor's position.
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international arbitration. Just as the authority of a court decision
can be derived from the authority of the court structure, rather than
from the specific judge who delivered the decision, so it might be
argued that arbitration awards can achieve authoritativeness
through the creation of a procedure-based "institutional" authority.
As a result, authority could be conveyed to an award by the
"institution" of arbitration, thereby compensating for the lack of
conveyable authority from the arbitrators. To examine this
argument it is necessary first to explore the rationales for
procedural uniformity in arbitration, as this will determine the
plausibility of claiming that any form of institution of arbitration
has indeed resulted.
The drive to procedural uniformity in international arbitration
has been motivated primarily by two distinct goals. First, there is
the very thing that has been behind the increase in popularity of
arbitration, namely the desire to avoid local idiosyncrasies in
dispute resolution.10 2 Businesses commencing operations in an
unfamiliar country face the risk that if any dispute arises they will
be forced into a court system that may be substantively biased
against foreign parties, and, at the very least, will use unfamiliar
procedural rules, thereby placing the foreign business at a
disadvantage in litigation. Yet arbitration can hardly serve as a
successful means of resolving this problem if arbitration is itself a
fundamentally different procedure in different parts of the world.
Global businesses incorporating arbitration clauses into their
contracts want to be assured that they are indeed selecting a
specific dispute resolution procedure, not merely selecting a
procedure that is "not litigation" but in all other respects will vary
widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
This might be termed the "defensive" rationale for uniformity,
according to which businesses support the move toward uniformity
in international arbitration as a means of ensuring some form of
substantive predictability in their choice of arbitration over
litigation. It should be noted, however, that because the dominant
rationale for selecting arbitration is precisely that it allows parties
in international transactions to remain outside local peculiarities of
dispute resolution, what this "defensive" rationale justifies is in
fact not uniformity of arbitration but merely predictability. That is,
102. Claus Bihring-Uhle, A Survey on Arbitration and Settlement in
International Business Disputes, in SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 2, at 25 (reporting a survey of arbitrators, attorneys, and in-house
counsel, in which neutrality of the forum and the enforceability of arbitral
awards were selected as the two most important reasons for choosing
international arbitration).
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businesses benefit little from an arbitral system that is the same
everywhere because the reality is that the disputes they encounter
in international business, along with the parties involved in those
disputes, will themselves vary. As a result, the best way to resolve
those disputes will vary as well. Consequently, while a uniform
approach to arbitration around the world will indeed provide
businesses with predictability, it will often produce unsatisfactory
results. The defensive rationale for uniformity does not, as such,
justify uniformity but only openness as to the procedures to be
adopted in any given forum so that businesses can select arbitration
with full knowledge of the procedures that will result.
The second rationale for procedural uniformity in arbitration,
and the more problematic one in the present context, is the pressure
for uniformity resulting from the fact that because arbitration does
not require court appearances it presents an opportunity for
businesses to retain lawyers with whom they are already familiar
rather than having to find reliable new lawyers in each jurisdiction
in which a dispute arises. ° 3 Yet these lawyers will, of course, wish
to use procedures with which they are familiar. Consequently, no
matter where in the world the arbitration is held, and no matter
from where either party originates, attorneys attempting to
maximize the prospect of their own client winning will press for
the procedures with which they are already familiar. As a result,
the dominance within international arbitration of attorneys and law
firms from only a very small number of countries results in a
significant _pressure for procedural uniformity in arbitration across
the world. '04
This second driving force for uniformity in international
arbitration has behind it what might be called the "offensive"
rationale for uniformity. The motivation for attorneys to produce a
uniform system of international arbitration is not to produce a
"level playing field" but rather to ensure that the procedures
adopted are at least those with which they are familiar. An attorney
cannot, after all, serve his clients well if the opposing party's
attorneys are significantly more familiar with the procedures under

103. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 63, at 22 ("A party to an international
contract which does not contain an agreement to arbitrate is likely to find, if a
dispute arises, that it is obliged.., to employ lawyers other than those who are
accustomed to its business . ").
104. For example, the rating by Chambers & Partners of the top twenty-five
firms in international arbitration does not include a single firm outside Europe
and the United States See Chambers & Partners, Arbitration (International):
Global, http://www.chambersandpartners.com/Editorial.aspx?ssid=30382 (last
visited Mar. 24, 2009).
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which the arbitration will operate and thereby know how best to
use those rules to their own client's advantage.
While both rationales for procedural uniformity within
international arbitration, "offensive" and "defensive," attempt to
justify the same goal, it is far too easily ignored that they are
nonetheless fundamentally separable, as they serve very different
purposes. The "defensive" rationale merely aims to protect the
party to the arbitration against unfair procedures, while the
"offensive" rationale attempts to enforce certain procedures that
will most likely result in a particular party's victory. The problem
that contemporary international arbitration faces, then, is not an
increase in procedural uniformity per se but that the increased
uniformity that can be observed arises from the "offensive"
rationale, not the "defensive." By the time the procedures for the
arbitration are to be selected, the parties have already retreated into
the background of the dispute resolution process, leaving matters
to be predominantly guided by their attorneys. As a result, the
"offensive" rationale for uniformity dominates procedural
decisions even if the "defensive" rationale underlay the decision to
choose arbitration in the first place.
This dominance of the "offensive" over the "defensive"
rationale for uniformity has important consequences with respect
to the authority of the resulting award because it undermines the
ability of international arbitration to develop the kind of
institutional authority that might replace the lost authority of
arbitrators. While a significant degree of procedural uniformity has
developed within international arbitration, 05 because of the
dominance of the "offensive" rationale for uniformity, these
increasingly standardized procedures have not been consciously
selected because of their perceived enhanced usefulness for
suitably settling disputes between parties. Instead, they have
resulted from decisions made by lawyers who view these
procedures not as inherently desirable but rather as allowing them
the maximum ability to effectively represent their own clients.
However, it is precisely this unity-between the individuals
who attempt to use arbitral procedures for their own ends and the
individuals who design and control those procedures-that
prevents the development of any form of "institution" of
international arbitration capable of delivering authority to arbitral
awards. While the rules of a court system are also routinely
manipulated by attorneys attempting to effectively represent their
clients, authority for a court judgment can often still be derived
105. POuDRET & BESSON, supra note 80, at 485 ("[I1nternational arbitration
proceedings tend towards uniformity.").
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from the structure of the court system because the rules structuring
those courts, and the rules employed in their proceedings, are
consciously designed by independent third parties with an interest
0 6
often at odds to both parties in any specific dispute.
Consequently, the rules in question are abstracted from the
disputes that they govern.
Arbitration, on the other hand, is unable to attain the level of
abstraction necessary for it to be viewed by parties as a genuinely
separate institution. This might be possible if the "defensive"
rationale were behind arbitration's increased procedural
uniformity, as the motivation behind this rationale is precisely a
desire to abstract arbitral disputes from any particular context and
provide rules that are uniformly fair, no matter who the
participants are in an arbitration. The "offensive" rationale for
uniformity, however, is singularly unable to deliver this necessary
abstraction. Because the uniformity it generates results solely from
the desires of attorneys zealously representing their clients, the
independence from the dispute that is necessary for the creation of
an authoritative institution is simply unavailable. As a result,
procedural uniformity in contemporary international arbitration,
motivated as it is by the offensive rationale for uniformity, is
simply unable to lead to the creation of any "institution" of
arbitration, and thus the procedural uniformity within international
arbitration cannot deliver any authority to an arbitral award.
Part VI of this Article will address the final way in which
authority can be delivered to an arbitral award, namely through the
specific procedures used to conduct the arbitration. It will argue
that authority derived from procedure is the only remaining means
by which authority can be delivered to arbitral awards but that,
under current approaches to the design of arbitral procedures, such
authority is simply unlikely to result.
VI. THE SHIFT FROM AUTHORITY OF ARBITRATORS TO AUTHORITY
OF PROCEDURE

This Article argued that the contemporary structure of
international arbitration serves to impair and largely preclude the
deliverance of authority to international arbitral awards. However,
it should be acknowledged that even if arbitration itself does not
possess the structural ability to deliver authoritative awards, it
nonetheless remains possible for parties to select an arbitrator who
106. That is, the rules of procedure are ultimately controlled by a legislature,
which introduces concerns of justice, efficiency, and consideration of third-party
interests that may not be important to the parties.
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is authoritative for both parties and can thereby deliver an award
authoritative for them.
Unfortunately, such situations are highly unlikely in the
context of contemporary international arbitration. Selecting an
arbitrator authoritative for both parties was plausible in traditional
arbitration, as the restricted level of transnational or other longdistance business meant that most disputes arose between parties
who operated within a single business community. As a result, it
was possible to select an individual from the community in which
both parties operated who would be authoritative for both parties,
both because of his standing within that community and because
the parties and the arbitrator all had a shared conception of the
norms that governed the business conducted by the parties.
In the context of contemporary international arbitration,
however, such a situation rarely exists. Through the very nature of
international business, parties will usually come from distinct
business communities. As a result, it will not only be difficult to
find a single individual who will be authoritative for both parties,
but parties will indeed often lack the shared substantive norms that
facilitated dispute resolution in traditional arbitration.
This part of the Article will argue, though, that these
difficulties should not be viewed as precluding contemporary
arbitral awards from being authoritative. Instead, arbitral awards
can still be authoritative when they are delivered through a
procedure specifically tailored for the parties, as a properly
designed procedure will assure both parties that its views have
been understood and considered, thereby enabling the award to
possess "insight"-based authority. Since, as argued above, no other
rationale for authority is usually available for an international
arbitral award, actively tailoring arbitral procedures to the
identities of the parties to the dispute is the only means by which
an authoritative award can be delivered in contemporary
international arbitration.
Of course, the connection between authority and procedure in a
dispute resolution mechanism is clear in a negative sense because
no matter how much authority a judge or judicial authority might
have, if a party feels they were not treated fairly procedurally, they
will not respect any judgment delivered. However, while
procedure's ability to remove authority from a judgment is clear,
its ability to deliver it, with no support from other sources, is less
clear.
One problem in this respect is that the procedure and the
arbitrator are ultimately difficult to separate entirely. An
incompetent arbitrator, for example, can drain authority from even
the most well-designed procedure, as the procedure merely ensures
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that the necessary information has been properly provided to the
arbitrator but does not ensure that his own judgment will be
properly exercised. In order for procedure to deliver authority to an
award, then, there must be at least an acceptable level of
competence of the arbitrator such that the poor quality of the
arbitrator's work will not eliminate whatever authority the
procedure may have been able to deliver. Once the appropriate
level of arbitrator competence is attained, however, it will
ultimately be the nature of the procedure, and not the identity of
the arbitrator, that delivers authority to the resulting award.
Of course, because arbitration already provides parties with the
ability to design their own dispute resolution procedure, it may be
argued that the procedures actually used in contemporary
arbitration must clearly be the preferred procedures of the parties
who use arbitration. Consequently, so it would be argued, if
procedure is capable of delivering authority to an award, then
authority can already be delivered to an award through the
procedures of contemporary international arbitration. However,
such an argument ignores the context in which contemporary
arbitrations occur. As previously discussed, contemporary
international arbitrations generally arise as a result of pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate any and all disputes within a particular
substantive area. These agreements very rarely include any kind of
detail regarding the procedures to be adopted in the arbitration and
at best merely refer to the rules of a particular arbitral institution or
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules. 10 7 Such rules, by design, provide
only the bare bones of an arbitral procedure, as they are intended to
apply only when parties cannot agree on necessary procedural
rules. 10 8 That is, they are designed to ensure only that the
arbitration will function, not that it will function well. Thus, the
selection of such rules can hardly be taken as a substantive
endorsement by the parties of a particular way of conducting an
107. See, for example, the arbitration clause recommended by the International
Chamber of Commerce, the most prominent international arbitration institution:
"All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall be
finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said
Rules." International Chamber of Commerce, Model Clause, http://www.iccwbo.
org/court/english/arbitration/worddocuments/modelclause/mc_arbenglish.txt
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
108. BORN, supra note 45, at 450 ("[A]I1 leading institutional rules provide
only a general framework for arbitral proceedings. Within the broad framework
provided by the institutional rules, the parties and tribunal are left free to work
out the details of particular arbitral procedures as they see fit.").
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arbitration any more than an agreement to any form of "backup
plan" constitutes an endorsement of that plan as the best course of
action.
Moreover, as previously noted, once an arbitration arises, and it
is unavoidably necessary to decide the procedures to be adopted,
all efforts at amicable negotiation between the parties will have
failed, and the parties will have hired attorneys to handle their
arbitration. These attorneys, of course, will approach design of the
arbitral procedure with a clear eye on tactical advantage, including
the adoption of procedures familiar to them. They will, that is, not
attempt to design a procedure that will deliver an award
authoritative for the parties but will instead attempt to install
tactically favorable procedural rules, while relying on the high
enforceability of arbitral awards, to make authority unnecessary for
the winning party to be paid. As a result, agreement between the
09
two sides on all but the broadest points of procedure will be rare,1
and even such agreements will overwhelmingly reflect the
procedural judgments of the attorneys rather than the identities of
the parties.
Consequently, while much effort is put into researching and
selecting an arbitrator that, it is hoped, will hold views favorable to
the position of the nominating party, 11 very little effort is put into
the design of the arbitral procedures. Instead, choice of procedures
is overwhelmingly left in the hands of the arbitrators, who usually
have total freedom so long as the procedure adopted allows each
party to fully and fairly present its own case."11 As already argued,
however, these arbitrators will have been selected for strategic
reasons rather than because of any particular understanding of the
identity of the parties. Consequently the procedures they select,
however fair and balanced, will not be ones specifically designed
to deliver an award authoritative to the parties in question.
In contrast to this situation, when parties have participated in a
proceeding that was specifically designed to match both their
identities and their dispute, they will each have reason to regard the
award as authoritative. Such a procedure will be able to provide the
arbitral panel with insight into the parties and their relationship that
is necessary to deliver "insight"-based authority to the award.
109. Park, supra note 48, at 289 ("[O]nce the arbitration begins, litigants
almost by definition are more like a bickering old couple than an amorous
twosome, and thus may not agree on much.").
110. See supra note 74.
111. Park, supra note 48, at 281 ("Arbitrators can conduct proceedings in
almost any manner they deem best, as long as they respect the arbitral mission
and accord... fundamental fairness .... ).
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If, then, it is granted that authority can only be delivered to
contemporary international arbitral awards through the tailoring of
the procedures of the arbitration to the specific parties involved in
the dispute, the current means by which those procedures are
selected are manifestly incapable of performing this task. Rather
than delivering procedures tailored to the parties and the dispute,
procedures are predominantly adopted to suit the pre-existing
preferences of arbitrators and to ensure a formalized and
"objective" hearing of the dispute. As a result, the awards
delivered, no matter how fair and balanced the arbitral proceeding,
do not possess the "insight"-based authority that procedure is
capable of delivering.
The final part of this Article will build upon the argument that
the procedures adopted in an arbitration are capable of delivering
"insight" authority to the resulting award. It will propose two
specific alterations to current international arbitral practice, which
it will be argued would suffice to return authority to contemporary
international arbitral awards.
VII. A PROCEDURAL SUGGESTION FOR RESTORING AUTHORITY TO
ARBITRAL AWARDS

This Article has argued that the traditional means by which
authority was delivered to arbitral awards are no longer available
in international arbitration and that no alternative means of
delivering authority to awards has been developed. This final part
of the Article briefly outlines a means by which "insight"-based
authority can be returned to international arbitral awards, with only
an alteration to the current system rather than a revolution.
Importantly, the argument is merely that the process described here
should be available as an option, not that it should be mandatory,
as any system designed to increase the rate at which arbitral
awards are accepted, rather than challenged, must be a free choice
of the parties rather than imposed upon them.
As has been argued, while international arbitration may be
structurally incapable of delivering authority to awards, it still
remains possible for individual awards to possess "insight"-based
authority when they have been delivered as a result of procedures
designed specifically for the parties to the dispute. The proposal
offered here, then, specifically addresses the means by which
arbitral procedures should be determined and the role of arbitrators
in contemporary arbitration. As this description suggests, the
proposal involves two elements: one addressing the means by
which the arbitral institution under which the arbitrations in
question would be held can contribute to the proper design of the
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arbitral proceedings and the other addressing the role that
arbitrators serving in those arbitrations should be seen as
undertaking.
In contemporary international arbitration, arbitral institutions
are ultimately merely administrative bodies. They resolve
challenges to arbitrators, process documentation, and perform
other similar administrative duties; l2 they also adopt institutional
arbitral rules to provide a backup system should the parties be
unable to reach ajgeement on a matter essential to the conduct of
the arbitration.'13 They do not, however, provide any form of
significant guidance to parties on how their arbitration should be
run. Rather, in recognition of the desired control of parties over
the nature of their own arbitral proceeding, institutions merely
facilitate the arbitration designed by the parties or by the arbitrators
they have selected.
However, as argued above, the current structure of
international arbitration means that leaving the selection of
procedures either to the parties or to the arbitrators they have
selected is very unlikely to result in the delivery of an authoritative
award. Only when the procedures can be seen to have been
designed by a genuinely independent third party, with particular
attention paid to the identities of the parties and the nature of their
dispute, will the parties to the arbitration have any reason to view
the resulting award as authoritative. Rather than leading to a
conclusion that authority is simply impossible for arbitral awards,
though, this situation provides an opportunity for arbitral
institutions to assist parties in securing an authoritative award by
providing an independent individual capable of designing the
procedure of the arbitration in a form to which the parties and
arbitrators must then adhere.
It should first be emphasized that the suggestion being made is
not that those individuals currently serving as case administrators
at arbitral institutions should be asked to commence designing
112. For an excellent discussion of the practices of the ICC, arguably still the
pre-eminent international arbitration institution, see Inside the ICC's Case
Management Processes, Part I, http://www.cpradr.org/tabid/45/articleType/
ArticleView/articleld/359/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2010); Leveraging the
Institution: Part 2 of ICC Case Management Processes, http://www.cpradr.org/
tabid/45/articleType/ArticleView/articleld/369/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 24,
2010).
113. See, e.g., ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION (2008); LCIA ARBITRATION
RULES

(1998); SCC ARBITRATION RULES (2010).

114. Arbitral institutions will provide general guidance in the form of
statements regarding which procedures have worked well or poorly in prior
arbitrations held under that institution. However, they will not provide the kind
of highly personalized guidance under discussion here.
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arbitral procedures for the arbitrations that they assist. While
sometimes enormously capable, such individuals are employed in
their roles because of their ability to assist parties, not because they
are viewed as having any particular insight into the specific
identities and desires of the parties with whom they are working.
Parties, then, would rarely be appreciative of efforts by such
individuals to instruct them on how their arbitration should be run.
Instead, what is being proposed here is the creation of the role
of "procedural special master," whose role would be to design an
arbitral procedure that would genuinely serve both parties' needs
and interests. Although the need to deliver an award authoritative
to the parties would suggest that the procedural special master's
recommendations should only be adopted with the consent of both
parties, it is proposed instead that while the identity of a procedural
special master should be a matter of agreement between the
parties, the special master's recommendations should be taken as
binding on the parties, absent agreement by both parties to reject
one or more of them. This is important because procedural special
masters would work with parties who have reached a point at
which agreement on any issue likely to be dispositive to the case is
highly unlikely. There would therefore be a very high probability
that such parties, and certainly their attorneys, even if they enter
into discussions with the procedural special master in good faith,
would ultimately refuse to agree to any procedure that they see as
even slightly favorable to the other side. Consequently, a
procedural special master must have the power simply to mandate
certain procedures once both parties have been heard and their
views seriously considered, unless both parties agree that a certain
procedure should not be adopted. However, it should be
emphasized that this does not preclude the special master from
offering an explanation for the procedures to the parties when
questions are raised, as without such an explanation the risk is high
that a party will decide the procedures were not fairly selected.
It might be argued that arbitrators already have the power to
design the procedures of an arbitration to suit the parties and that
the creation of the role of procedural special master is therefore
unnecessary. As has been mentioned, however, arbitrators are
ultimately tied up too tightly in the context of the arbitration for it
to be possible to view them as providing a clearly impartial choice
of procedures. Just as importantly, this objection ignores the fact
that arbitrators are selected due to their possession of a very
specific set of skills, and thus individuals perfectly suited for the
role of arbitrator will often be very poor at understanding and
balancing the different perspectives on procedural justice that
underlie the design of successful dispute resolution procedure.
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Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that precisely because
the procedural special master must have the ability to impose
procedures upon the parties, party consent is essential to both the
use of a procedural special master and to the identity of that
mediator. This is an area in which an arbitral institution is able to
be of particular importance, as the parties are unlikely simply to
know a particular individual with not only the deep knowledge of
arbitral procedure necessary for the role but also the level of
understanding of both parties necessary to design a suitable dispute
resolution procedure. Arbitral institutions, then, could develop
panels of procedural special masters just as they currently often
have panels of arbitrators. ' 5 The individuals on these panels would
be appointed to the panel precisely because they possess the
professional qualities necessary to perform the role well, and the
parties would need only select an individual they find mutually
acceptable.
Once appointed, the procedural special master would consult
with the parties and their attorneys to develop the procedures,
which would be specifically tailored to the parties and the nature of
the dispute, taking into account their cultural backgrounds,
individual needs and preferences, and the facts and likely
procedural issues of the case. The special master would, however,
remain formally attached to the arbitration throughout its course to
ensure that any additional significant procedural elements are
addressed by the same individual and thus resolved in a way
consistent with the original procedural model. It could, of course,
be highly inefficient to require the special master to decide all
procedural issues as they arise, suggesting that once the initial
rules are put in place, the arbitrators should decide remaining
6
issues until a party requests the special master's involvement."
The involvement of a procedural special master would go a
significant way toward restoring authority to arbitral awards by
ensuring that the procedures used in an arbitration are designed to
match the parties involved. However, as noted above, it is
impossible to entirely separate the procedure of an arbitration from
the arbitrators presiding over it. Consequently, it is also desirable
115. See, e.g., Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the ICDR
International Roster of Neutrals, supra note 81.
116. This is, of course, not an ideal solution, as any party requesting the
involvement of the procedural mediator would then risk alienating the arbitrators
in its case. However, so long as the procedural mediator has initially performed
her job properly, serious issues that would require her subsequent involvement
should be rare. She will, after all, have significant experience on which to draw
with respect to the kinds of procedural issues likely to arise and can therefore
proactively address such issues in the rules constructed for the arbitration.
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that a change be adopted in the role arbitrators are perceived as
performing in international arbitration.
It is a standard view in international arbitration that all
arbitrators, including those nominated by the parties, should be
both independent of the parties and able to decide impartially
between them." 7 This is often contrasted with the traditional rule
in domestic arbitration in the United States, where party-appointed
arbitrators were regarded as "advocates" on the
18 panel for the views
of the party that appointed them to that panel.'
However, while this insistence upon independence and
impartiality for all arbitrators on the panel is in itself desirable, it
has come to be enmeshed in the judicialization of the role of the
arbitrator, with the consequence that arbitrators are viewed as
ideally not only independent and impartial but also detached from
the parties and wholly objective. As argued above, though, this
precludes the three-arbitrator panel from performing its ideal
function as a displacement of the negotiations of the parties.
The recommendation being proposed here, then, is that while
arbitrators should still retain an obligation to be genuinely
independent and impartial, they should also be encouraged to see
themselves as the party's representative on the panel. Their
ultimate decision on any matter should, of course, be made from an
impartial perspective, but throughout deliberations a partyappointed arbitrator should see herself as responsible for
understanding the legal position of the party that appointed her and
then conveying those arguments to the other arbitrators. In turn, of
course, in order to be able to decide matters fairly and objectively
she must also be open to the views of the other side. Her
responsibility, then, is solely to effectively express the legal
position of the party that nominated her, not to attempt to help that
party win. Only in this way can a tribunal reach the ideal of serving
as a displacement of the parties' negotiations, carefully attending
to the arguments advanced by both sides, and then deciding based
on a genuine understanding of the perspectives of both parties
rather than merely as a result of a detached judgment on the facts
and the law.
While both of these suggestions are likely to be highly
controversial, the argument of the preceding parts of the Article
have attempted to establish that these suggestions are indeed

117. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 46, at 82.
118. BORN, supra note 45, at 875 ("Historically, party-nominated arbitrators
in the United States have been understood to have a measure of partiality
towards the party that appointed them.").
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necessary if international arbitral awards are to regain their lost
authority.
VIII. CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to demonstrate that contemporary
international arbitration is currently not fulfilling its full potential
as a dispute resolution procedure even though this fact is not
widely perceived in the arbitration community. While international
arbitration as a form of dispute resolution grows continually more
popular, it has steadily and unavoidably become detached from the
elements that delivered its original validity. As a result, it gradually
resembles less and less a system designed genuinely to resolve
disputes between parties and more merely a means of getting an
enforceable judgment in a business context in which enforceable
judgments have been traditionally rare. As a result, contemporary
international arbitration risks becoming solely a means of
enforcement rather than anything that genuinely resembles dispute
resolution. This Article has argued that the involvement of
procedural special masters and the reconceptualization of the role
of party-nominated arbitrators can help resolve this situation and
return authority to arbitral awards.
While many parties in international arbitration will
undoubtedly initially be happy to remain within the current system
and will reject any suggestion that procedural rules should be
imposed on their arbitration, or that arbitrators should be anything
other than judicial, it is to be expected that a significant market
already exists of parties who wish a genuine resolution to their
dispute rather than merely an award that can be enforced by
whichever party is victorious. If the services suggested here were
offered by any arbitral institution, they would therefore be happily
used, even if only as an alternative to the now-dominant approach
to arbitration, rather than as a replacement for it.

